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MUDDLING ALONG WITH THE FEDERAL
WEALTH TRANSFER TAX:
A SURVEY OF PRACTITIONERS AND
LAW SCHOOL PROFESSORS
Wayne M. Gazur*
Editors' Synopsis: Recent efforts to repeal the wealth transfer tax system have
prompted enormous discussion. In this Article, the author presents the results of
his survey of members of the American Bar Association Real Property, Probate
and Law Section about this issue and other reforms which have been enacted or
suggested.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal wealth transfer tax' system has undergone incremental
legislative changes of varying degrees,2 but Congress recently enacted the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 19971 (TRA 1997) amidst calls for a complete
repeal' of the federal levy. Belying the "death taxes"5 label and predicting
1 The following three complementary taxes comprise the federal wealth transfer taxes:
the gift tax, see I.R.C. §§ 2501-24 (1986), the estate tax, see I.R.C. §§ 2031-2209 (1986),
and the tax on generation-skipping transfers, see I.R.C. §§ 2601-63 (1986).
2 See Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX . REV. 223
(1956) (discussing the history of estate and gift taxes, the objectives of the estate tax, and
the extent that the tax achieves those objectives). Most tax enactments of the last two
decades have included wealth tax revisions with varied degrees of significance. See Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (repealing the 1976 generation-
skipping transfer tax statute and prospectively implementing an improved version);
Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,95 Stat. 172 (introducing the unlimited
marital deduction and increasing the amount of unified credit); Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, (unifying the estate and gift tax rate, credit structures in
lieu of specific exemptions, and introducing the most significant overhaul of the system
since the Great Depression); Harry Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After
ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1983) (identifying problems with the transfer tax); Stanley S.
Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303 (1976).
3 Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
4 See Tax Policy: Gingrich Argues for Simpler Tax Code, Calls for Annual Tax Cuts
in Peacetime, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Sept. 9, 1997 available in 1997 WL
174 DER G-3 [hereinafter Tax Policy].
Gingrich also called for legislative action to eliminate estate taxes, which he
called the "death tax."
"There is no reason you should visit the IRS and the undertaker in the same
week," he said. "You could eliminate the death tax just on what they're wasting
on the earned income credit."
Id. Congressman Christopher Cox introduced a bill in the 105th Congress that would repeal
the federal wealth transfer tax. See Family Heritage Preservation Act, H.R. 902, 105th
Cong. (1997). A number of other Republican-sponsored bills sought the same result. See,
e.g., S. Res. 29, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 525, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 736, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.R. 249, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 802, 105th Cong. (1997); S. Res. 31, 105th
Cong. (1997); Estate and Gift Phase-Out Act of 1997, S. Res. 31, 105th Cong. The pressure
to repeal all federal wealth transfer taxes is constant. See, e.g., Sougata Mukherjee, Small
Businesses Clamor for More Relief, DENV. Bus. J. Dec. 5-11, 1997, at 33A. The article
noted that "Congressional leaders have been getting an earful in the waning days of the
105th Congress from the Washington-based Family Business Estate Tax Coalition, a group
of more than 100 farm and business organizations. They have argued that the 1997 tax cuts
fell far short of making any effect on most small businesses." Id. Another article stated:
Further estate tax changes remain the first priority for contractors, says Brian
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the form and impact of potential changes to federal wealth transfer taxes are
lively topics for professors and concerns for estate planning practitioners.6
Pallasch, chief lobbyist for the American Subcontractors Association. The estate
tax section of the 1997 tax bill was "more like a down payment, but it doesn't do
enough of what needs to be done to help small businesses get passed along to
other family members," said Pallasch. Contractors support repeal of the estate
tax, but would settle for additional relief.
Congress Pressed to Lighten Estate Tax Load Some More, DAILY J., Feb. 13, 1998, at 1.
Indeed, on September 15, 1999, the House of Representatives and the Senate sent the
Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. 1st Sess. (1999) (1999
Act) to President Clinton for his signature. See 145 CONG. REc. 8383 (Sept. 17, 1999)
(statement of Rep. Thomas from the Committee on House Administration reporting that the
legislation was sent to the President). On September 23, 1999, President Clinton vetoed the
legislation. See 145 CONG. REc. 8613 (Sept. 23, 1999) (setting forth the veto message from
the President). In general, Title VI of the legislation repealed all wealth transfer taxes for
years after December 31, 2008, substituting a new I.R.C. § 1023 instituting a carryover basis
regime in lieu of I.R.C. § 1014. However, Congress did not "put to death" wealth transfer
tax principles. For example, the carryover basis rules incorporated current estate tax
principles under I.R.C. § 2056 to determine whether property was considered "acquired" by
a surviving spouse for purposes of an exemption of up to $3,000,000 for property acquired
from the decedent by the surviving spouse of the decedent. This proposal retains the rule
of I.R.C. § 1014 for such property. The rules also incorporated other current estate tax
principles under I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2038, 2040, 2041, and 2042(1) in determining whether the
property would be "includible" in the estate of the decedent for purposes of another
exemption preserving I.R.C. § 1014 treatment for property of "small" estates under
$2,000,000.
5 Congressman Newt Gingrich adopted the phrase "death tax" in referring to the federal
wealth transfer taxes in statements reported on September 9, 1997. Gingrich also referred
to visiting the undertaker and the taxman during the same week. See Tax Policy, supra
note 4. Curiously, Mr. Frank Luntz, a public opinion consultant, also used that phrasing in
an earlier April 1997 memorandum "Explaining and Communicating the Death Tax."
There is virtually no tax reform proposal out there that is easier to explain than
estate tax repeal-or what I like to call "Death Taxes." From "taxing the
American Dream" to "you shouldn't have to visit the undertaker and the taxman
on the same day," the language of Death Tax repeal is easy for working and
retired Americans to understand and appreciate.
Explaining and Communicating the Death Tax, Memorandum from Frank Luntz of Luntz
Research Companies to All Interested Parties 1 (Apr. 1997) (on file with author and The
Center for the Study of Taxation). Mr. Luntz offers "Key Words to Use When Talking
About the Death Tax" Id. at 8. Those words are "penalizes," "punishment," "confiscation,"
"devastating," "anti-success," "anti-child," and "anti-American dream." Id.
6 See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, A Brieffor the Abolition ofAll Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1215 (1984); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE
L.J. 259 (1983). For more sources, see Estate Tax-A Bibliography, 75 TAX NOTES 19
(1997).
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A. The Survey Subjects
In this Article, I discuss a survey of practicing estate planning attorneys
and law professors about possible changes to the federal wealth transfer tax.
I selected estate planning attorneys because they are first-hand witnesses to
the circumstances and costs of the planning process, including7 the impact
of wealth transfer taxes on family businesses.8  Predictably, many
practitioners have conflicting views of the wealth transfer tax system. On
the one hand, the estate planner's livelihood depends on the continuation of
the system.9  Other self-interested parties include federal' ° and state"
7 Scholars and practitioners dispute the total cost of taxpayer compliance and Service
administration. See infra text accompanying notes 53-59.
8 Small business owners and farmers are particularly loud critics of federal wealth
transfer taxes. The impact of wealth transfer taxes on family businesses and farms spurred
Congress to pass the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. See Gutman, supra note 2, at
1197-1202, 1209-12. The National Federation of Independent Business recently made
wealth transfer tax reform and elimination of the Internal Revenue Code a priority. The
organization is soliciting "horror stories about the effects of death taxes on your family
business." National Federation of Independent Business, Death Taxes-Take Action Issues
for Small Business (visited Jan. 30, 1999) <http://www.nfibonline.com/politics/stories/
deathtaxstories.html>.
9 "The estate tax has few friends, other than tax attorneys .. " William W. Beach, The
Casefor Repealing the Estate Tax (The Thomas A. Roe Inst. for Econ. Policy Studies, The
Heritage Found., Washington D.C.) Aug. 21, 1996, at 3.
10 The federal revenue yield from wealth transfer taxes is increasing and sparing other
revenue sources. In 1996 federal estate and gift taxes raised almost $18 billion. See U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1998, at 347 tbl.551 (118th ed.
1998). However, some commentators assert that abolition of the federal wealth transfer
taxes will increase other federal tax revenues by more than the wealth transfer taxes lost.
See infra note 60.
1" State treasuries collect their share of derivative "sponge" or "gap" state death tax
credits. Congress provides a limited credit against the federal estate tax for state death taxes
paid. See I.R.C. § 2011 (1994). The estimated 1998 federal credit for state death taxes is
$4.12 billion. See ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR
FISCAL 1999 ch. 5 (1998), reprinted as Tax Expenditures Chapter From the President 's
Fiscal 1999Budget, in 78 TAX NOTES 911,938 tbl.5-6 (1998) [hereinafter Tax Expenditures
Chapter]. While beneficiaries bear state inheritance taxes, the "sponge," "gap," or "pick-
up" tax structure used by many states does not cost the beneficiaries additional taxes because
the tax is equal to the credit available at the federal level for state death taxes. This system
is a form of federal revenue sharing with the states. The overwhelming majority of states
limit their estate taxes to the federal credit. See Joshua S. Rubenstein & Eileen Caulfield
Schwab, Historic New York Estate and Gift Tax Reform, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 20, 1997, at I n.3,
(describing the status of the state enactments as of August 20, 1997). If the federal tax were
repealed, the arguments for the derivative state taxes would be eliminated. Several states
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governments, charities, 2 and life insurance providers. 3 On the other hand,
some practitioners may be generally opposed to the concept of wealth
transfer taxes as a matter of principle.
Estate planning law professors are the other subjects of the survey.
These professors may have strong views of the system, but their livelihoods
have entertained proposals to repeal their state inheritance taxes. See, e.g., Delaware:
Governor Carper Signs Budgets with Cuts in Business, Personal, Inheritance Taxes, DAILY
REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Jul. 6, 1998 available in 1998 WL 128 DER H-I; South
Dakota: Legislator Pushes Petition to Repeal Inheritance Tax, DAILY REPORT FOR
EXECUTIVES (BNA), Jul. 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 146 DER H-i; Iowa: Governor
Signs Bill Cutting Inheritance Taxes, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Feb. 12,
1997, available in 1997 WL DER 29 d83 (quoting Iowa Governor Branstad as calling the
inheritance tax "one of the biggest enemies of the family farm and family-owned
businesses.").
12 Tax benefits encourage donations to charities. In 1998, the estimated tax revenue
loss for charitable contributions was $4.39 billion. See Tax Expenditures Chapter,
supra note 11, at 938 tbl.5-6. Experts generally predict that the unified credit increases in
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 will not affect charitable contributions. See Fred Stokeld,
Estate Tax Reduction Unlikely To Hurt Charitable Bequests, 77 TAX NOTES 275 (1997).
One commentator has argued that the federal wealth transfer tax may actually reduce
philanthropy when the demand for private bequests is inelastic and the remainder is to pass
to charity. See RICHARD E. WAGNER, FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXATION: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
COST 34-40 (Center for the Study of Taxation 1993). Under that theory, less wealth goes
to charity because the estate must use part of it to pay the taxes on the gift to heirs. Id.
Compare Michael J. Boskin, Estate Taxation and Charitable Bequests, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 27,
27 (1976) (concluding that (1) the "price elasticity of charitable bequests is considerably
greater than one for all but the very largest estates" and (2) the estate tax charitable
deduction stimulates "at least as much additional giving to charity as revenue lost by the
Treasury"), with Thomas Barthold & Robert Plotnick, Estate Taxation and Other
Determinants of Charitable Bequests, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 225 (1984) (arguing that (1) higher
tax rates appear to raise the likelihood of leaving a charitable bequest and (2) have no effect
on the size of the bequest; the deductibility of charitable bequests does not appear to be an
efficient method of increasing the flow of funds to charitable organizations).
13 From a federal taxation standpoint, life insurance companies sell one of the most
beneficial products. Life insurance proceeds are generally excluded from the beneficiary's
taxable income. See I.R.C. § 101 (1994 & West Supp. 1998). Subject to various
restrictions, the inside buildup in value of the life insurance contract is not taxable. See id.
The exclusion of interest on life insurance savings ranks as the twelfth largest tax
expenditure, with an estimated 1999 revenue loss of $14.2 billion. See Tax Expenditures
Chapter, supra note I1, at 925 tbl.5-3. For estate tax purposes, individuals may avoid
I.R.C. § 2042 by having a person other than the insured own the incidents of ownership of
the policy. Of course, that "person other than the insured" often takes the form of an
irrevocable life insurance trust that requires the assistance of an estate planning attorney.
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do not directly depend upon the continued existence of the system. 4
Professors are important participants in the debate over the future of the
wealth transfer tax system because they initiate many reform proposals.'5
Accordingly, one of my objectives in this survey was to gauge the reactions
of professors and practitioners and possibly evoke further discussion of
these ideas.
In Part I of this Article, I describe the survey procedure. In Part II, I
describe the results of several background questions that possibly color the
survey responses. I report the results of the substantive questions in Part III,
and in Part IV I report the results of open-ended questions concerning the
future of the wealth transfer tax system. Finally, I offer my conclusions in
Part V.
I intended this survey as a tool to predict the impact of reform
proposals, such as the Taxpayer Reform Act of 1997 (TRA 1997) or
complete abolition of wealth transfer taxes. I also designed the survey to
test the strength of opinions about various proposals to change or replace
wealth transfer taxes. The survey reflects the participants' perceptions of
the controversial tax treatment of family businesses.
B. The Survey Methodology
I created two survey instruments-one for practicing attorneys and one
for law school professors. The surveys addressed some issues outside the
scope of this Article, but the relevant portions of the survey instruments are
reproduced in Appendices A and B.
1. Practitioner Sample
On September 26, 1997, I mailed a test sample to fifty-six Colorado
lawyers who identified themselves in the Martindale-Hubbell Law
14 In the long term, the repeal of the federal wealth transfer taxes without a replacement
could decrease the demand for tax law professors. However, tenured professors could retain
their positions and teach other subjects.
See sources cited supra note 6.
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Directory as estate planners.16 I sent the surveys by first-class mail, typed
the addresses instead of printing labels, and included a cover letter
addressed to each recipient. On October 6, 1997, I mailed a reminder letter
to each recipient.17 Of the fifty-six surveys mailed, the postal service
returned six as undeliverable. Of the remaining fifty delivered surveys,
twenty-four recipients (48%) completed and returned their surveys within
the period from September 30, 1997, through December 2, 1997. I
modified the questionnaire to respond to issues raised by the test sample
and tried to determine the size of the final sample.' 18
16 As of June 18, 1998, 453 Colorado lawyers listed estate planning as part of their
practice. Search of Martindale-Hubbbell Law Directory (June 1998). As of April 1998,
22,851 lawyers had registered to practice in Colorado, and 11,837 were in private practice.
This information was gathered during a telephone conversation by the author with personnel
of the Colorado Office of Registration for Lawyers in May 1998.
17I modeled the structure of the survey instrument and the mailing procedures after the
"total design method" suggested in a survey treatise. See DON A. DILLMAN, MAIL AND
TELEPHONE SURVEYS-THE TOTAL DESIGN METHOD (1978). Strict adherence to the total
design method would have been costly and somewhat intrusive. For example, the method
requires additional written reminders and a replacement questionnaire with the second
follow-up letter. See id. at 183. However, additional reminders reduce the percentage of
non-responses and thus reduce the risk of bias. See id. at 52.
18 The sample size must be large enough to apply the probability assumptions
underlying sampling theory, such as the central limit theorem. Opinions differ, but
statisticians usually propose a minimum of thirty observations. DOUGLAS A. LIND &
ROBERT D. MASON, BASIC STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 227 (2d ed. 1997).
"There is no common agreement as to what constitutes a 'sufficiently large' sample size.
Some statisticians say 30; others go as low as 12 .... As the sample size becomes larger
and larger, the distribution of the sample means becomes closer and closer to the bell-shaped
normal distribution." Id. Researchers also must select a desired confidence level and an
acceptable standard error. Because most of the survey questions involve percentages of
participants who would use certain techniques, much of the sampled information is in the
nature of a proportion. Ideally, the researcher would use the sample proportions from the
Colorado test sample to predict a sample proportion for the final sample. However, because
of the multiple questions, no one proportion prevails. Accordingly, a proportion of 0.50 is
appropriate. "So if no estimate of [the estimated proportion based on past experience or a
pilot survey] is available, .50 should be used." Id. at 247. The formula for the sample size
is n=p( !-p) (z/E)2, where p is the estimated proportion, z is the statistical value associated
with the degree of confidence selected, and E is the maximum error the researcher will
tolerate. See id. at 246-47. 1 chose a 95% level of confidence and a maximum error of 5%.
Solving for n, n=.50 (.50) (1.960/.05)2, or 384. The Colorado pilot sample had a 48%
response rate, but I cut that rate in half to 25% to estimate the final sample size because the
mailing methodology changed. At a 25% response rate, at least 1,536 surveys are required.
At an assumed 20% response rate, at least 1,920 surveys are required, which is close to the
1,966 ultimately mailed.
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For the final survey I considered several sources that listed estate
planning attorneys 9 and settled on the membership of the American Bar
Association Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section.2" For the final
survey, the Section created peel-off mailing labels for 1,966 members. The
Section drew these members from two groups. First, the Section drew 864
members from the estate planning committees2 on the assumption that the
committee members are more active estate planners.22 Second, the Section
randomly drew the remaining 1,102 members from the general Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law Section pool. However, the Section
excluded law students, government lawyers, judges, legal services
attorneys, public defenders, military lawyers, corporate law department
attorneys, American Bar Association staff attorneys, law school faculty,
part-time practitioners, and retirees.23 The goal was to include only
attorneys engaged in the full-time private practice of law with some
19 The Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory is available on CD-ROM and permits a
search by area of practice with other limits, including state and city. West's Legal Directory
is available on the Internet and on Westlaw and permits searches by major practice areas or
keywords. See Westlaw, West Legal Directory (1999) <http://www.wld.com/Welcome.
asp>; West Legal Directory available in 1999 WL. In addition, the National Association of
Estate Planners and Councils maintains a Directory of Accredited Estate Planners, listing
member attorneys, trust officers, insurance salespersons, and accountants. See National
Association of Estate Planners and Councils <http://www.naepc.org/nc directory.cfm>.
20 The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel was willing to consider my
request to distribute the survey at their fall 1997 meeting, but I could not complete the
surveys in time. I also was concerned that the membership of that organization consisted
of specialists who might not be representative of a broad range of practicing estate planners.
21 The individuals were members of committees RP500000-603000. Approximately
sixty-five committees make up the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section. See
Probate and Trust Committees (Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/rppt/ ptcommittees.
html>.
22 This approach did not create a pure randomly selected sample. The Section targeted
all committee members to ensure that estate planning specialists were included because
some members of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section are real property
lawyers instead of probate and trust lawyers. I will not try to justify the nonrandom
inclusion of the committee members on the basis of stratified sampling technique, although
authority exists to support it. "Stratified sampling is commonly used by social scientists
because it can lend an extra ingredient of precision to a simple random or systematic
sample. When selecting a stratified sample, the researcher divides the population in strata.
The strata must be categories of a criterion." ALAN BRYMAN & DUNCAN CRAMER,
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 101-02 (revised ed. 1994).
23 Based on responses from retired attorneys and trust officers, the exclusion filters
were not foolproof.
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emphasis on estate planning.24
February 3, 1998, was the date of the survey package mailing.2" A
reminder postcard went out approximately ten days later. Both were first-
class mailings. Of the 1,966 surveys mailed,26 the postal service returned
24 The membership of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section included
approximately 30,000 members when the Section drew the sample. At the same time, the
total membership of the American Bar Association included approximately 328,000
members. See e-mail letter from Stacy Walter of the American Bar Association to Wayne
M. Gazur (Oct. 15, 1997) (on file with author). As of 1996, the estimated number of
individuals employed as lawyers in the United States was 880,000. See DEP'T. OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1997, at 410 tbl.645 (117th ed. 1997).
Defining the population or universe being sampled is a difficult problem. The least
problematic approach would be to define the population simply as members of the Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law Section. A researcher would need to make further
assumptions to conclude that the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section is
sufficiently representative of membership of the American Bar Association, practicing estate
planners in general, or practicing lawyers in general. The optimistic conclusion is that the
members of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section are roughly representative of
attorneys in the United States who are in private practice and engaged in estate planning.
Interestingly, the size of the population is largely irrelevant to determine the appropriate
size of a random sample.
Contrary to expectations, the size of the same relative to the size of the population
(in other words n/N) is rarely relevant to the issue of a sample's accuracy. This
means that sampling error-differences between the sample and the population
which are due to sampling-can be reduced by increasing sampling size.
However, after a certain level, increases in accuracy tend to tail off as sample size
increases, so that greater accuracy becomes economically unacceptable.
BRYMAN & CRAMER, supra note 22, at 104. "The precision of a sample statistic does not
depend on the size of the population, as long as the population is much larger than the
sample." DAVID S. MOORE, STATISTICS CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 17 (1979).
However, population size does play a role in an adjustment for samples that are a substantial
percentage, generally five or more percent, of the population being tested. This adjustment
is the "finite-population correction factor." LIND & MASON, supra note 18, at 240-41. The
factor might apply to the law professor sample because the complete population of law
professors teaching federal estate and gift taxation or estate planning is so small.
25 The package consisted of a cover letter, the survey questionnaire, and a business
return envelope.
26 Practitioner Malcolm A. Moore and Professor Jeffrey N. Pennell of Emory
University School of Law conducted two surveys of registrants of the University of Miami
Philip E. Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning. See Malcolm A. Moore & Jeffrey N.
Pennell, Practicing What We Preach: Esoteric or Essential?,27 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1 1200
(1993) [hereinafter Miami Survey I]; Malcolm A. Moore & Jeffrey N. Pennell, Survey of the
Profession II, 30 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1500 (1996) [hereinafter Miami Survey I1]. In the
second survey, the response rate was 11.9%.
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twenty-three as undeliverable, and 250 recipients (14.50%) completed and
returned the survey. 7 The reasons for failure to respond varied. Seven
recipients declined because they did not practice in the estate planning area,
and five responded that they were retired. One recipient had passed away,
while another did not complete the survey due to poor eyesight. One had
already submitted the earlier Colorado test survey, and one objected to the
survey.
The response rate on the final sample was lower than the rate for the
test sample probably because the mailing procedure was different. We
compromised on certain survey techniques to address cost concerns and the
sheer size of the final sample. The following changes removed the
specificity and individuality from the mailing:
1. The envelopes had typed addresses in the test sample, but
peel-off labels in the final sample.
2. In the test sample, I individually addressed and manually
signed each cover letter, but the final sample contained a "Dear
Counselor" salutation and a photocopy of my signature.
3. The test sample's reminder was a personally addressed
letter, but the final sample's reminder was a form postcard with a
peel-off address label.
4. The test sample was limited to Colorado where I am a
professor at a local public university, but I sent the final sample to
a national audience.
5. The final sample contained names drawn randomly from the
general membership of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
Section, which includes a number of attorneys practicing in real
27 A 20% response rate was assumed in selecting the size of the sample. See supra
note 18. Applying the formula discussed in that footnote (see LIND & MASON, supra
note 18, at 246-47) to the actual 250 subject sample in solving for the maximum allowable
error yields an error of 6.2%. The formula would appear as follows: 250=.50 (.50) (1.96/x) 2 .
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property and not estate law.28
Because of the potential bias from those who did not respond to the
survey questionnaire, I will sometimes compare the national sample to the
results of the Colorado test, which had a high response. However, the
possibility of a regional bias may affect the comparison.2 9
2. Law Professor Sample
I modified the practitioner survey for law professor recipients. I
purchased mailing lists from the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) of all professors of estate and gift taxation or estate planning. The
survey package went out on February 3, 1998, to all 275 professors on the
list, and I mailed a reminder postcard approximately ten days later.
The postal service returned one survey as undeliverable. Of the 274
surveys delivered, thirty-seven professors (13.50%) completed and returned
the package. Two professors declined to respond because they did not teach
in the field, and one professor had passed away. One professor received
two surveys but completed only one.3"
C. Compilation
I entered the survey data into a personal computer using the Statistical
Package for Social Sciences 8.0 for Windows. I entered and identified the
surveys in the order I received them. The questionnaire instructed the
28 If I were to redesign the survey, I would select a sample from the Martindale-Hubbell
Law Directory and West's Legal Directory estate planning specialty designations. See supra
note 19. I also would mail fewer surveys, but conduct a more intense follow-up with the
participants, in the manner of the Colorado pilot survey.
29 For example, if the sample were drawn from a state with significant agricultural
activity, that would probably skew responses about tax valuation of farmland under section
2032A. Professor Cooper's survey of various estate planning techniques, which ranged
from basic tools to more exotic holding company structures, uncovered some regional
differences. See George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated
Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 168 (1977).
30 The lists were supposed to eliminate double inclusion, but the procedure was not fool
proof.
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participants not to disclose their identity anywhere on the survey.
II. BACKGROUND QUESTIONS
The survey included several general background questions. For
example, the questionnaire asked about years of experience and the
percentage of practice devoted to estate planning. I designed these
questions to measure the level of experience and expertise of the survey
subjects. Information on the participant's gender, political views, and level
of personal wealth reflected relationships between those variables and other
views expressed in the survey. Accordingly, a positive correlation might
exist between a very conservative political outlook and support to abolish
the federal wealth transfer tax. Likewise, an individual with personal
wealth who is potentially subject to the estate tax may foreseeably support
the abolition of those taxes to serve personal interests. Moreover, age may
play a part in the responses. For example, senior estate planning attorneys
with a lifetime invested in learning the system may resist change.
A. Years of Estate Planning Experience
Practitioners responded to the following question: "How many years
of estate planning experience do you have?" Similarly, professors answered
the following question: "How many years of estate planning experience in
private practice do you have?"
Figure 1





More than 20 54.9 27.1
The practitioners predictably had more years of experience because
the practice of law is their principal occupation. However, 62% of the
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professors had six or more years of practical estate planning experience.
Therefore, both the practitioners and professors had adequate estate
planning experience to answer the survey questions knowledgeably and
bolster the validity of the survey conclusions.
B. Percentage of Practice Devoted to Estate Planning
The questionnaire asked practitioners to report the "percentage of
your practice.., devoted to estate planning.'
More than half (54.9%) of the practitioners indicated that they
spent more than half of their time in estate planning.32 On average, they
311 might have used other indicators of expertise, such as state specialty certifications,
or membership in specialist organizations. However, I did not want to limit responses to
specialists. The Colorado test respondents tended to have a higher level of expertise; 8.3%
reported that estate planning was 21-30% of their practice, 25. 1% reported 31-50%, 20.8%
reported 51-60%, 20.8% reported 61-80%, and 25.1% reported 81-100%.
32 In the second survey conducted by Moore and Pennell, 88% of the respondents
indicated that they spent greater than half of their time or billables in estate planning. See












Mean Percentage of 52.86%
Practice
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devoted 52.86% of their practice to estate planning. Accordingly, I
concluded that the practitioners represented a desirable concentration of the












Mean Age 52.15 years 53.85 years
D. Gender3
Figure 4





The questionnaires asked all participants the following question: "How
33 In the Colorado test sample, 87.5% of the respondents were male and 12.5% were
female.
34 In the Colorado test sample, 4.2% described themselves as very liberal, 20.8% as
somewhat liberal, 41.7% as moderate, 25% as somewhat conservative, and 8.3% as very
conservative.
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would you generally characterize your political views and convictions?"
The questionnaire listed the range of possible answers from 1 to 5.
Figure 5
Description Practitioners Professors
Very Liberal (1) 1.6% 17.1%
Somewhat Liberal (2) 21.6 37.2
Moderate (3) 30.2 31.4
Somewhat Conservative (4) 35.6 5.7
Very Conservative (5) 11.0 8.6
Average 1-5 Ranking 3.33 2.51
F. Personal Wealth
Both practitioners and professors responded to the following question:
"With the current exemptions, if you were to pass away, would your estate





Don't Know 2.0 5.4
No Response 3.2 5.4
Il1. SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS
A. The Impact of Change on Fees
Legal fees for estate planning play a significant role in the wealth
transfer tax debate. From the client's perspective, the price they pay for
wealth transfer tax planning is a nonproductive cost that should be
35 In the Colorado sample, 50% had taxable estates, and 50% did not. This question
was poorly conceived because it fails to address the marital deduction. However, marital
status raises the additional issue of spousal assets. Accordingly, the question could have
asked: "With the current exemptions, upon your death (or if you are married, upon the death
of the survivor), would your estate or the estate of your surviving spouse pay an estate tax?"
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minimized or eliminated. However, isolating the portion of estate planning
that is devoted to tax concerns is enlightening. Some clients may not
realize that eliminating the federal wealth transfer taxes still would not
eliminate the need for general estate planning. Furthermore, assuming that
tax planning costs should be minimized, assessing the impact of the TRA
1997 on fees may shed light on the debate. Finally, estimating the impact
of a complete abolition of the federal wealth transfer tax on legal revenues
may reveal the nature of the interests at stake. I designed the survey to
address these reform issues.
1. Breaking Down the Fees
The questionnaire asked practitioners to provide "the net worth of your
typical estate planning client." The wealth level of the typical client
indicates the role of the federal wealth transfer tax in estate planning
activities.
Figure 7














Mean Net Worth36  $2,234,192
36 To determine the mean of the net worths, I made several computational
compromises. First, since I entered the information as a range, the mean computation was
the midpoint of the range. Second, for the three respondents who claimed typical client net
worths in excess of $21 million, the mean computation used $21 million, rather than the
larger amounts. Third, several participants reported very broad ranges that would span
several categories. Consequently, I applied simplifying assumptions.
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The estate and gift tax unified credit amount in 1998 was $625,000. 3"
Accordingly, clients with a net worth in excess of $2,000,000 require tax-
driven planning, and federal wealth transfer taxes are a primary concern to
the practitioners' typical clients.
The second step was estimating the estate planning fee paid by the
typical client. The practitioners responded to the following question:
"Although it is very difficult to generalize, what would be your estimate of










Mean typical fee $2,553
The typical fee covers more than services for wealth transfer tax
planning. Therefore, the survey asked practitioners: "Again, although this
is very difficult to quantify in most situations, what percentage of the fee
would be strictly succession and disposition related, without any federal
wealth transfer tax consequences?"
The survey also asked professors about estate planning fees, although
professors necessarily base their estimates of the non-tax charges on a
combination of dated private practice experience, written or oral accounts
from practicing lawyers, and sheer speculation. Consequently, the question
to professors contained an additional phase and asked: "What percentage of
the fee paid to practitioners for estate planning services by a typical estate
planning client would be strictly succession and disposition related, without
any federal wealth transfer tax consequences?" Figure 9 shows the
comparison of the results to these questions.
17 See I.R.C. § 2010(c) (West Supp. 1998).
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Figure 9







Mean percentage of non-
tax services 43.38% 40.44%
Although a subsequent question addresses the theoretical impact of a
wealth transfer tax repeal, these results also may be a rough measure of that
impact on fees. However, these percentages may not reveal the full impact
of a wealth transfer tax repeal because the question did not address the
possibility that clients may neglect to seek other estate planning if they do
not have tax savings as an incentive. In this regard, Professor Willard
Pedrick argued that the wealth transfer tax was an incentive to overall estate
planning. "But surely our experience tells us that it is concern over taxes
that brings great numbers of estate planning clients to the office. Taxes,
especially federal levies, get the property owner's attention ....
Nevertheless, although some practitioners believe that a wealth transfer
tax repeal would significantly reduce revenue from non-tax services, the
results of the survey do not support this forecast. The practitioners
estimated, on average, a 41.62% overall decline in revenues.3 9 That amount
is less than the tax-driven portion of estate planning services suggested by
subtracting from 100% the "non-tax services" responses to the previous
question, which produces 56.62% for practitioners and 59.56% for
professors.
38 Willard H. Pedrick, Through the Glass Darkly: Transfer Taxes Tomorrow, 19 INST.
ON EST. PLAN. T 1900, 1 1903 (1985).39 See infra Figure 15 and text accompanying note 48.
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2. Predicting the Impact of TRA 1997
One potential benefit of the increase in the unified credit under the TRA
1997 is the decrease in the need for wealth transfer tax planning.
Accordingly, the survey asked practitioners: "By how much, if any, will the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 changes increase or decrease the typical estate
planning fee amount?" Figure 10 shows the results.
Figure 10
Practitioners Estimated Standard Deviation
Mean Fee
Change
Decrease in fee 4.4% -$670 $709
Increase in fee 8.4 +$517 $596
No change 77.2 $-0-
Do not know 10.0
Practitioners overwhelmingly predicted no change in the amount of the
typical estate planning fee. The practitioners who predicted a decrease
estimated an average decrease of $670, with a standard deviation' of $709
40 The standard deviation is a measure of the dispersion of a distribution of values. For
example, if all the values in a population were each equal to four the mean would be four,
and the standard deviation would be zero because no dispersion of values occurs. However,
if one value was six and the other was two, the mean would still be 4, but the standard
deviation would be 2.82. The mean alone is potentially misleading because the two values
of the population, six and two, are dispersed or distant from that mean number of four. The
standard deviation is computed to measure the degree of dispersion. A large standard
deviation reflects a greater dispersion.
The standard deviation is an absolute number of the same scale of the population values
and can be directly compared with those values. The standard deviation is computed by
taking the square root of the variance. The variance in turn is computed by: (1) calculating
the mean of the values in the population or sample; (2) calculating the difference between
the mean and each value in the population or sample, seriatim; (3) squaring each difference;
(4) summing the values computed in (3); and (5) dividing that sum by the number of values
in the population or sample. For example, with a population consisting of two values as
above, where one value is six and the other is two, the mean (step 1) would be 4 (i.e.,
6+2/2=4. The sum of the squares of the differences from the mean (steps 2-4) would be (6-
4)2 + (2-4)2, or 4+4= 16. Dividing 16 by the number of values in the population or sample,
2, yields 8 as the variance (step 5). The standard deviation is then computed as the square
root of the variance, 8, and that number is 2.8284.
If the population was a normal distribution, a standard deviation of 2.82 would
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and a range of $99-$2,500. The practitioners who predicted an increase in
the fee estimated an average increase of $517 with a standard deviation of
$596 and a range of $50-$2,500.
Because most of the practitioners thought the TRA 1997 would not
significantly change the average fee, the mix of services (i.e., tax and non-
tax) also should remain static. To test that conclusion, I asked practitioners
and professors: "After taking into account the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
changes, what would be the percentage [of strictly succession and
disposition related fees]?" Figure 11 shows the results.
Figure 11









non-tax services 40.59% 37.66%
A comparison of these figures to the estimates of non-tax services prior
to the 1997 legislation (43.38% for practitioners and 40.44% for
professors4 ) reveals that the percentages fell for both practitioners and
professors. That result contradicts predictions that the TRA 1997 "changes
will alter estate planning practice, experts say. Lawyers will spend less time
on tax strategies and more time on succession and business planning. "42
demonstrate that approximately 68.26% of the values in the population would lie within a
range of + or - one standard deviation from the mean. Accordingly, the range would be
1.18-6.82. Similarly, 95.44% of a normal population lies within a range of + or - two
standard deviations. For further explanation of the concept of standard deviation see HENRY
W. FISCHER, III, THE SOCIOLOGIST'S STATISTICAL TOOLS 72-73 (1996).
41 See supra Figure 9 and text accompanying note 38.
42 Corey E. Fleming, Estate Tax Changes Will Alter Lawyers' Practices, LAWYERS
WEEKLY USA, May 19, 1997, at 22.
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Another survey question asked: "With respect to the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997, what do you expect to be the impact of the amendments on
your estate planning practice revenues?" The question for professors was
similar, but I substituted the word "private" for "your."
Figure 12
Impact of Practitioners Mean Change Professors Mean
TRA 1997 Change
on revenue
Decrease in 4.0% -17.82% 16.2% -19.0%
revenues
Increase in 20.8 +16.73 35.1 +11.0
revenues
Roughly no 70.0 0 43.3 0
change
Do not know 5.2 - 5.4 -
Practitioners who predicted a decline in revenues estimated an average
decline of 17.82%, with a standard deviation of 24.10. For professors, it
was 19%, with standard deviation of 7.42. Practitioners who predicted an
increase in revenues estimated an average percentage increase of 16.73%,
with a standard deviation of 13.56. For professors, it was 11%, with a
standard deviation of 3.95.
The increase in the unified credit under TRA 1997 will gradually move
more estates into the nontaxable category.43 Although some individuals will
no longer require tax-driven estate planning, the question remains whether
the increase is dramatic enough to change the perceptions of clients and
discourage them from seeking legal advice from estate planners. The
survey reflected this uncertainty because the overwhelming majority of
43 The House Conference Report for TRA 1997 estimates an $843 million revenue loss
in 1999 from the increase in the unified credit (including the family owned business
exclusion), $1.259 billion in 2000, $1.816 billion in 2001, $2.013 billion in 2002, $2.596
billion in 2003, $2.997 billion in 2004, $5.656 billion in 2005, $7.279 billion in 2006, and
$8.638 billion in 2007. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-220, at 781 (1997), reprinted in 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1592.
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practitioners predicted no change in revenues," while a larger percentage
of professors predicted either an increase or decrease.
Overall, average fees per client and the number of clients determine
changes in practice revenues. In Figure 12, 70% of practitioners believed
that the TRA 1997 would not affect overall revenues and 20.8% believed
that overall revenues would increase. Figure 10 showed that only 8.4% of
the practitioners expect an increase in the typical estate planning fee. A
comparison reveals that the estimated increase in total revenues must be
attributable to an increased number of clients. If the prediction holds true,
TRA 1997 will not reduce taxpayer transaction costs.
The survey participants reported an average client net worth of
$2,234,192.45 The TRA 1997 changes may not affect the participants'
clients because the average net worth amount exceeds the unified credit
increases.46 On the other hand, the TRA 1997 may affect less wealthy
clients who will not need tax-related planning work. Consequently, I
separated the data according to the wealth of the typical client. Figure 13
shows a cross-tabulation of the percentage of non-tax estate planning
services reported by practitioners against typical client net worth.
Practitioners predicted that clients who are currently on the cusp of taxable
status, at net worths of $601,000 to $900,000, will receive a greater
percentage of non-tax services because of the scheduled increases in the
unified credit. Still, the data does not show a clear pattern or support a
predicted result that the TRA 1997 will increase the proportion of non-tax
services for most clients.
"The question did not specify a time frame. Perhaps practitioners believe that the
increases in the exemption will not keep pace with the rate of asset appreciation.
45 See supra Figure 7 and text accompanying note 36.
46 When fully phased in by the year 2006, the unified credit exclusion will be
$1,000,000. See I.R.C § 20 10(c) (West Supp. 1999).
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Figure 13
Client Net Worth Non-Tax Services
Prior to TRA 1997 After TRA 1997
$ 50- 300,000 62.40% 50.25%
301 - 600,000 56.11 52.00
601 - 900,000 47.46 56.04
901- 1,200,000 47.30 46.98
1,201 - 1,500,000 45.77 47.46
1,501 - 2,000,000 38.80 35.26
2,001 - 2,500,000 40.02 31.80
2,501 - 3,000,000 44.22 43.73
3,001- 5,000,000 36.57 34.62
5,001 - 7,000,000 26.20 30.20
9,001 -11,000,000 32.75 30.25
15,001 -17,000,000 30.50 30.50
21,000,000+ 30.25 30.25
In Figure 10, the overwhelming majority of the practitioners (77.1%)
predicted no change in the typical estate planning fee after the TRA 1997
changes. In Figure 14, I measured this response against the typical client's
net worth.
Muddling Along With the Federal Wealth Transfer Tax 541
Figure 14
Percentages of Practitioners predicting changes in
typical planning fee amounts according to their
clients' net worth
Client Net Worth Decrease Increase No Do Not
In Fee In Fee Change Know
$ 50- 300,000 0.00% 0.00% 57.14% 42.86%
301 - 600,000 0.00 0.00 82.35 17.65
601 - 900,000 0.00 13.79 75.87 10.34
901 - 1,200,000 11.11 7.41 70.37 11.11
1,201 - 1,500,000 3.23 12.90 80.64 3.23
1,501 - 2,000,000 13.64 9.09 75.00 2.27
2,001 - 2,500,000 3.70 7.41 77.78 11.11
2,501 - 3,000,000 0.00 12.50 68.75 18.75
3,001 - 5,000,000 0.00 0.00 90.00 10.00
5,001 - 7,000,000 0.00 16.67 83.33 0.00
9,001-11,000,000 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
15,001-17,000,000 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
21,000,000 + 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
Even at the more modest net worth levels, the practitioners did not
predict a decrease in the typical estate planning fee.47 This comparison
reveals that dramatic changes may be necessary to meaningfully address
concerns about the transaction costs represented by estate planning fees.
Critics may be correct to argue for the elimination of the entire system.
3. The Impact of Repeal
The questionnaire asked practitioners: "If the federal estate, gift, and
generation skipping transfer tax were abolished entirely (without a direct
replacement), what would you expect to be the impact on your estate
planning practice revenues?"
47 This prediction is difficult to accept, considering estimates that the increase in the
unified credit will cut federal wealth transfer tax revenues. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-
220, supra note 43, at 781. The survey results may reflect the practitioners' expectations
of asset inflation, higher transaction costs produced by the uncertainty accompanying
reforms of any nature, or flatly wrong speculations.
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Professors answered a similar question, but I substituted the word
"private" for "your."
Figure 15
Practi- Mean % Professors Mean %
tioners Change in Change in
Revenues Revenues
Decline in revenues 78.8% -41.62% 91.9% -47.66%
Increase in revenues 3.2 +39.12 0.0 0.0
Roughly no change 12.8 0.00 2.7 0.0
Do not know 5.2 0.00 5.4 0.0
The impact of a total repeal of the wealth transfer tax on estate planning
professionals was a concern of many practitioners in the months leading up
to the enactment of TRA 1997.48 Practitioners who predicted a decline in
revenues estimated an average decline of 41.62%, with a 20.37 standard
deviation. Professors predicted an average decline of 47.66%, with a
standard deviation of 20.59. Practitioners who predicted an increase in
revenues, estimated an average increase of 39.12%, with a standard
deviation 27.73. This estimated 41% decline predicted by an overwhelming
78.8% of the responding practitioners gives practitioners a real stake in
perpetuating the current state of affairs, and it may influence their behavior
in debates over potential amendments to the wealth transfer tax laws. As
we turn to proposals for change, support may grow for incremental
approaches such as increased exemptions, which would retain the current
system rather than totally repeal it.
48 Talk of such reform has even extended to a complete repeal of the estate
tax! In times past, many industry soothsayers have greeted such talk by
sounding the death knell; theorizing that no justifiable reason would
remain to employ probate specialists, trust officers and others who
practice in our profession. Of course, these predictions couldn't have
been more inaccurate and there is no reason to believe that this year's
proposals will in any way adversely affect our professional lives.
Ronald A. Sages, Impending Transfer Tax Reform: Is the Sky Falling?, TR. & EST., Jul.
1997, at 24.
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B. Opinions About Reforming the System
The wealth transfer tax system generates a great number of proposals
for change. I designed this survey to measure the degree of agreement
among practitioners and law professors on some of the common proposals.
The survey asked practitioners and professors to indicate their
agreement or disagreement with fourteen statements concerning the federal
wealth transfer tax,4 9 ranking their opinions on a scale of one through five.5"
1. Proposals for Abolition of the Federal Wealth Transfer Tax
Several of the survey's statements addressed reasons why the current
system should be abolished, without suggesting an alternative to replace it.
Statement 1 "The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished because
it significantly discourages entrepreneurial activity."
49 The questionnaire section contained the following preface: "Please indicate your
agreement or disagreement with the following statements. If a question refers to a 'family
business,' assume a business in which family members are directly involved in managing
or final decisions or in which family members have substantial ownership of the business."
50 This common style of ranking is referred to as Likert scaling. See BRYMAN &
CRAMER, supra note 22, at 64. Generally, the common statistical procedure is to perform
a test of statistical significance on data. The tester must predict an expected result and then
compare it to the observed result. If the observed result does not differ from the expected
result to a statistically significant degree, the result is deemed to be the result of a random
distribution. The Pearson chi-square is one of these tests. See generally, DUNCAN CRAMER,
FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH: STEP-BY-STEP CALCULATIONS AND
COMPUTER TECHNIQUES USING SPSS FOR WINDOWS 287-94 (1998) (describing the Pearson
Chi-Square test). To be statistically significant, the test must produce a degree of probability
of a random result of less than 0.05. See id. In applying the Pearson test to each of the
Likert scaled data, I arbitrarily assumed that each value of I through 5 had an expected
probability of 1/5 (20%). All of the practitioner questions were statistically significant. All
of the professor questions were statistically significant, in the 0.00 through 0.05 range,
except for Figure 17 (0.874), Figure 29 (0.096), Figure 26 (0.726), Figure 22 (0.675), Figure
33 (0.332), Figure 25 (0.250), Figure 20 (0.276), Figure 19 (0.625), and Figure 23 (0.305).
Compared to the practitioners, the smaller number of professors in the final sample increased
the likelihood of producing a result that was not statistically significant.
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Figure 16
Practitioners Professors
1. Strongly Disagree 18.7% 39.0%
2. Disagree 33.6 33.3
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 18.7 8.3
4. Agree 17.4 11.1
5. Strongly Agree 11.6 8.3
Average 1-5 ranking 2.70 2.17
This argument is a popular criticism.5 A majority of practitioners and
professors disagreed with the statement, although the professors expressed
stronger disagreement than the practitioners. Whether the professors based
their opinions primarily on objective evidence, such as personal experience
with family businesses, is difficult to discern. On the one hand,
practitioners showed a weak positive correlation between approval of this
statement and conservative political views.12 On the other hand, professors
51
Another possible response to the tax is to devote less energy to entrepreneurial
efforts for wealth creation and accumulation in the first place. To the extent those
efforts are motivated by a desire to leave bequests, the tax will lead to a
substitution of activities such as the pursuit of hobbies for the pursuit of business
activity, even without any change in retirement plans.
WAGNER, supra note 12, at 10.
Thus, the desire to leave a large estate is one of the primary motivations for
working and saving later in life. To the extent that the estate tax reduces a
parent's ability to leave an estate to his children, it will have a negative effect on
his willingness to accumulate wealth through work, saving, and investing.
Bruce Bartlett, The End of the Estate Tax, 76 TAx NOTES 105, 107 (1997) (citing a number
of commentators expressing this view).
52 A cross-tabulation of the practitioner responses against their political position
disclosed that 43.75% of the practitioners who identified themselves as conservative
(somewhat or very) agreed with the statement while 10.91% of those who identified
themselves as liberal (somewhat or very) agreed with the statement. Although the responses
appear to bear a relationship to the participants' general political outlooks, a statistical test
of correlation should be applied. The variable for political outlook was given the following
values: very liberal= , somewhat liberal=2, moderate=3, somewhat conservative=4, and
very conservative=5. Similarly, the respondents ranked their approval of the statement on
a I through 5 scale. Respondents ranked their age on a scale of 1 through 8 and taxability
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showed a moderately strong positive correlation between disapproval of this
statement and liberal political views.5"
of their estate on a scale of I through 2. Using these ranked variables, I applied Spearman's
correlation coefficient to measure the statistical degree of correlation. For a discussion of
Spearman's correlation coefficient, see SUSAN B. GERBER & KRISTIN E. VOELKL, THE SPSS
GUIDE TOTHE NEW STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA65-66 (1997); CRAMER, supra note 50,
at 371-73. The Spearman's correlation coefficient "is essentially a Pearson's correlation
data that have been ranked." CRAMER, id. at 371. With respect to the Pearson's correlation,
one commentator has ranked the levels of correlation as follows: +/- 0.8 to 1.0=very strong
relationship, +/- 0.6 to 0.79=strong relationship, +/- 0.4 to 0.59=moderately strong
relationship, +/- 0.2 to 0.39=moderately weak relationship, and +/- 0.0 to 0. 19=very weak
or no relationship. See FISCHER, supra note 40, at 106. For example, if the liberal
participants (ranked as 1 or 2) disagreed with the statement (ranked as 1 or 2) and the
conservative participants (ranked as 4 or 5) agreed with the same statement (ranked 4 or 5),
then a high degree of correlation between the participants' responses and political identity
would result. On the other hand, if the liberal respondents strongly disagreed with the
statement and the other participants' responses were scattered, then a much weaker degree
of correlation would result. If the liberal participants (ranked I or 2) agreed with a statement
(ranked 4 or 5), then a negative correlation would result.
Computing the Spearman's correlation coefficient for practitioners' responses to this
statement produced a 0.329 degree of correlation with political identification-a moderately
weak relationship at a statistically significant level of 0.000. A correlation of the responses
of politically conservative practitioners produced a weak 0.10 correlation coefficient at a
non-statistically significant level of 0.301. A cross-tabulation of the responses against age
of the participants, did not disclose a pattern. For example, of the practitioners aged 25 to
49, 53.7% disagreed with the statement compared with 52.5% of the practitioners overall.
I also cross-tabulated practitioner responses against the question of whether the
practitioner's estate would bear an estate tax. This comparison disclosed that 36.75% of the
practitioners with a taxable estate agreed with the statement, 21.93% of the practitioners
with a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement, and 29% of the participants overall
agreed with the statement.
53 Cross-tabulating professors' responses, 84.21% of liberal professors disagreed with
the statement, while 20% conservative professors disagreed with the statement. The result
was a Spearman's correlation coefficient of 0.515-a moderately strong relationship at a
statistically significant level of 0.002. This compared to the overall relationship of political
identification and approval of this statement. Calculating the responses of liberal professors
produced a Spearman's correlation coefficient of 0.342 at a non-statistically significant level
of 0.152.
A cross-tabulation of the responses against the age of the participant did not disclose
a pattern. For example, of the professors aged 30 to 49, 76.92% disagreed with the
statement, compared with 72.2% of the professors overall. I also cross-tabulated the
responses against the results of the question of whether the participant's estate would bear
an estate tax. The result was that 93.75% of the respondents with a taxable estate disagreed
with the statement and 43.75% with a non-taxable estate disagreed with the statement.
Overall, 72.2% of the professors disagreed with the statement.
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Statement 2 "The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished because
the revenue yield is probably less than the costs of its administration and
taxpayer compliance and planning." Figure 17 shows the results.
Figure 17
Practitioners Professors
1. Strongly Disagree 13.0% 13.9%
2. Disagree 24.2 25.1
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 23.8 19.4
4. Agree 21.8 19.4
5. Strongly Agree 17.2 22.2
Average 1-5 ranking 3.06 3.11
Estimates of administration costs have become part of the lore of the
federal wealth transfer tax. In 1981 Professor Gerald P. Moran estimated
that the total cost ofcompliance "probably exceeds the yield that Uncle Sam
receives. '54 More recently, the Center for the Study of Taxation, an
opponent of the wealth transfer tax, asserted that the cost of compliance is
less than previous estimates. The Center said that "it has been estimated
that the government and taxpayers collectively spend some 65 cents for
each dollar of estate and gift tax collected . . . for enforcement and
compliance activities." 5 Sixty-five cents is breathtaking but misleading
because it largely represents lost productivity from disincentives caused by
the levy of taxes.
5 6
54 David M. Hudson, Tax Policy and the Federal Taxation of the Transfer of Wealth,
19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 32 n. 174 (1983), citing Hearings on Major Estate and Gift Tax
Issues, S. 23, S. 395, S. 404, S. 557, S. 574, S. 858, Before the Subcomm. on Estate and Gift
Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., pt. 2, 96 (1981).
55 The Center for the Study of Taxation, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes: Are They
Worth the Cost? at 3, citing James L. Payne, Unhappy Returns, POL'Y REV., Winter 1992,
at 18.
56 Payne's article does not single out wealth transfer taxes, but criticizes the federal tax
system as a whole. Payne places government costs for net tax revenue at 0.61% and
business and individual compliance costs at 24.43%. Payne additionally estimates
"economic disincentive costs" (i.e., productivity discouraged by taxes) at 33.20% and "other
private-sector burdens" (i.e., the cost of engaging in tax avoidance activity) at 6.78%.
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The practitioners have a vested interest in this issue because their
professional services constitute a significant portion of the transaction costs.
Nevertheless, the practitioners' responses averaged close to that of the
professors." Conservative practitioners showed a weak positive correlation
for agreement with the claim as compared to liberal practitioners.58  The
professors' responses demonstrated no clear patterns.5 9
Statement 3 "The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished because
it reduces the income tax and employment tax yields by more than the
wealth transfer tax revenues it collects."
Payne, supra note 55, at 23.
571 also considered the response to this statement in light of the percentage of practice
devoted to estate planning. See supra Figure 2 and text accompanying note 31.
Surprisingly, practitioners who responded that they devote a large percentage of their
practice to estate planning did not agree less with proposals to abolish the wealth transfer
taxes. No statistically significant correlations emerged between the responses to the fourteen
statements proposing abolition and percentage of estate planning practice.
58 Although 39% of practitioners overall agreed with the second statement, 49.55% of
practitioners identifying themselves as conservative (somewhat or very) agreed with the
statement and 23.64% of the practitioners identifying themselves as liberal (somewhat or
very) agreed with the statement. Overall results showed a moderately weak relationship
between political identification and approval of this statement (Spearman's correlation
coefficient of 0.268 at a statistical significance of 0.000). A cross-tabulation of the
responses against the age of the participant disclosed slightly more agreement with the
statement by younger practitioners. Of the practitioners aged 25 to 49, 32.71% disagreed
with the statement, as compared with 37.30% of the practitioners overall. In the same age
group, 44.86% agreed with the statement, as compared with 39% of the practitioners overall.
Comparing responses to this statement against whether the respondent's own estate would
bear the estate tax, 40.52% of participants with a taxable estate agreed with the statement,
35.96% of the participants with a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement, and 39% of
practitioners overall agreed with the statement.
59 Of the professors identifying themselves as politically liberal (somewhat or very),
47.37% disagreed with statement 2, compared with 38.9% of the professors overall. A
Spearman's correlation coefficient for all professors demonstrated a weak to moderately
weak relationship between political identification and approval of this statement (0.195 at
a not statistically significant level of 0.270). Of the professors, 38.46% of those aged 30
to 49 disagreed with the statement, compared with 38.9% of the professors overall. Although
38.9% of professors overall disagreed with the statement, 68.75% with taxable estates
disagreed with the statement, but only 6% with non-taxable estates disagreed with the
statement.
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Figure 18
Practitioners Professors
1. Strongly Disagree 9.4% 30.5%
2. Disagree 32.3 27.8
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 42.1 27.8
4. Agree 10.2 8.3
5. Strongly Agree 6.0 5.6
Average 1-5 ranking 2.71 2.30
Arguments supporting this statement tend to be grounded in supply side
economics' or tend to focus on charitable giving patterns.6'
A majority of the professors disagreed with Statement 3. Conservative
practitioners more strongly agreed with the statement.62 Conversely, liberal
60 Richard E. Wagner simulated the effect of abolishing wealth transfer taxes on total
federal tax revenues from 1971 to 1991, assuming abolition in 1971. See WAGNER, Supra
note 12, at 24-26. Wagner concluded that the resulting increase in labor and capital inputs
would cause greater production, and increase other tax revenues, such as Social Security
taxes, corporate income taxes, and personal income taxes. The result would be $20.7 billion
in additional net federal tax revenues and $96.3 billion more state and local tax revenues.
See id. However, he concluded that if Congress had abolished the transfer tax in 1993, the
net tax change would be a deficit of $38.7 billion by the year 2000, although "[tihereafter,
net federal revenue gains might well emerge." Id. at 26. "A final argument is that the tax
causes losses in output and jobs that far outweigh the $19 billion it will pump into the
Treasury this year. Part of the damage results from the sale and breakup of thriving farms
and businesses." George J. Church, Death and Lower Taxes, TIME, May 5, 1997, at 50.
61 "Many give to charity to avoid the estate tax-and also pay lower income taxes as
a result. Stanford economist B. Douglas Bemheim says the lost income taxes may be equal
to the total estate tax revenues." The Dumbest Tax ofAll, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, March
6, 1997, at A30. "[A]vailable evidence suggests that, historically, true revenues associated
with estate taxation may well have been near zero, or even negative." B. Douglas Bernheim,
Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue? TAX POL'Y & THE ECON., 113, 115 (1987). "[I]n the
absence of far-reaching reform, it seems unlikely that the estate tax will do much more than
benefit charitable causes." Id. at 135.
62 Of those practitioners identifying themselves as conservative (somewhat or very),
23.15% agreed with statement 3, as compared with 7.41% of the practitioners identifying
themselves as liberal. Overall, the results revealed a moderately weak correlation of
political identification with approval of the statement (Spearman's correlation coefficient
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professors more strongly disagreed with the statement. 63
Statement 4 "The federal wealth transfer tax has failed in its goal to




1. Strongly Disagree 13.9% 19.4%
2. Disagree 22.7 19.4
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 33.1 27.9
4. Agree 18.5 22.2
5. StronglyAgree 11.8 11.1
Average 1-5 ranking 2.92 2.86
The responses of practitioners and professors are widely divided. The
of 0.203 at a statistically significant level of 0.002). Comparing the responses of only the
conservative practitioners produced a weak Spearman's correlation coefficient of 0.115 at
a non-statistically significant level of 0.236. A cross-tabulation of the practitioners'
responses against their ages did not disclose a pattern. Of the practitioners aged 25 to 49,
40.95% disagreed with the statement as compared with 41.70% of the practitioners overall.
In that same age group, 14.29% agreed with the statement as compared with 16.20% of the
practitioners overall. A cross-tabulation of the responses against whether the practitioner's
estate would bear an estate tax disclosed that 16.07% of practitioners with a taxable estate
and 15.93% with a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement, compared with 16.20% of
practitioners overall.
63 Of the professors identifying themselves as liberal (somewhat or very), 63.16%
disagreed with the statement. In comparison, 40% of the professors identifying themselves
as conservative (somewhat or very) disagreed with the statement. Overall results indicate
a moderately weak correlation between political identification and approval of the statement
(Spearman's correlation coefficient of 0.212 at a not statistically significant level of 0.228).
Comparing the opposing responses of liberal professors produced a moderately weak
Spearman's correlation coefficient of 0.381 at a non-statistically significant level of 0.108.
Of the professors aged 30 to 49, 53.85% disagreed with the statement, compared with
58.40% overall. Of the professors reporting a taxable estate, 87.5% disagreed with the
statement. Of those with a non-taxable estate, 25% disagreed with the statement. The
overall rate of disagreement by professors was 58.4%.
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average of the responses reflects that both practitioners and professors are
largely neutral on this statement. 64 However, conservative practitioners
more strongly agreed with the statement. 65 Conversely, liberal professors
strongly disagreed with the statement.66
In reviewing the responses to Statements 1 through 4, one finds that the
results reveal that practitioners and professors supported most strongly the
arguments that reflected practical considerations. For example, the second
statement was that the taxes should be abolished because the revenue yield
is probably less than the costs of administration and taxpayer compliance.
67
Both practitioners and professors gave it their highest approval. The
64 This issue has caused more commentary than it deserves. Bruce Bartlett has summed
up a number of the arguments:
Indeed, existing high estate tax rates appear to do virtually nothing to equalize the
distribution of wealth. Recent studies, in fact, have argued that wealth has never
been more unequal than it is today. One reason why estate taxes have less impact
on wealth distribution than people imagine is that inheritances constitute less of
the wealthy's assets than is usually thought.... Indeed, even among the super-
rich, inheritance counts for less than commonly believed....
Bartlett, supra note 51, at 109.
65 Of the conservative practitioners, 35.45% agreed with the statement, while 25.45%
of liberal practitioners agreed with the statement. Overall, a very weak correlation resulted
between responses to the statement and political identity (Spearman's correlation coefficient
of 0.165 at a 0.011 level of statistical significance). The Spearman's correlation for
conservative practitioners' responses was also a weak 0.181, barely falling on the side of
being non-statistically significant at 0.059. A cross-tabulation of the practitioners' responses
with their ages did not disclose an age-linked pattern. Of the practitioners aged 25 to 49,
34.29% disagreed with the statement as compared with 36.6% of the practitioners overall.
In that same age group 31.43% agreed with the statement as compared with 30.3% overall.
A cross-tabulation of the responses against whether the practitioner's estate would bear an
estate tax disclosed that 33.33% of the practitioners with a taxable estate agree with the
statement, while 26.32% with a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement. The overall
rate was 30.3%.
"None of the conservative professors disagreed with the statement, but 63.16% of the
liberal professors disagreed. Overall, a moderately strong correlation existed between
political identification and approval of this statement (Spearman's correlation coefficient of
0.511 at a statistically significant level of 0.002). The liberal professors' responses had a
moderately weak relationship to their political identification, producing a Spearman's
correlation coefficient of 0.205 at a non-statistically significant level of 0.4000. Of the
professors aged 30 to 49, 46.15% disagreed with the statement, as compared to 38.8%
overall. Of the professors with taxable estates, 43.75% disagreed with the statement. Of the
professors, with a non-taxable estate, 25% disagreed with the statement.
67 See supra Figure 17 and text accompanying notes 54-59.
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average 1-5 rankings for practitioners and professors were 3.06 and 3.11,
respectively. Yet, the TRA 1997 apparently did little to address the issue
of transaction costs.
A less practical statement was that the wealth transfer tax should be
abolished because it discourages entrepreneurial activity. 6 Although the
survey revealed a relative gap between practitioners and professors, this
statement was the least popular. The average 1-5 rankings for practitioners
was 2.70, while it was 2.17 for professors.
2. Proposals for Modification
Several statements in the survey deal with modifications to the current
system.
Statement 5 "The federal wealth transfer tax should be retained, but the
general exemption should be increased significantly for all decedents."
Figure 20
Practitioners Professors
1. Strongly Disagree 8.0% 8.3%
2. Disagree 15.2 30.6
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 19.8 19.4
4. Agree 37.2 25.0
5. Strongly Agree 19.8 16.7
Average 1-5 ranking 3.46 3.11
At first blush, this statement would contradict the economic self-interest
of the practitioners because a dramatically increased exemption would
reduce the number of clients requiring tax planning. However, the survey
revealed that the practitioners more strongly supported limiting transaction
costs in this manner than the professors. Both liberal and conservative
68 See supra Figure 16 and text accompanying notes 51-53.
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practitioners shared this conviction.69 Liberal professors were more likely
to disagree with the statement.70
Interestingly, in earlier questions on the TRA 1997 exemption
increases, most practitioners predicted no decline in their professional
services income.7 However, the difference may reflect a question of
degree, and an increase in the exemption beyond the magnitude of TRA
1997 could have a greater impact. Accordingly, the questionnaire asked
participants a follow-up question about the appropriate level of an
exemption: "In your view, what should be the amount of the general
exemption for the federal wealth transfer tax? $ (Use a
dollar exemption equivalent rather than a credit amount.)."
69 Of conservative practitioners, 55.86% agreed with the statement. Of liberal
practitioners, 58.18% agreed with the statement. The overall rate was 56.90%. A cross-
tabulation of the practitioners' responses against their ages did not disclose a pattern. Of the
practitioners aged 25 to 49, 54.72% agreed with the statement compared with 56.90% of the
practitioners overall. Of those aged 50 to 90, 58.91% agreed with the statement. A cross-
tabulation disclosed that 54.39% of those with a taxable estate and 60.18% of those with a
non-taxable estate agreed with the statement, compared with 56.90% of the practitioners
overall.
70 Of the liberal professors, 57.89% disagreed with the statement while none of the
conservative professors disagreed with the statement. Overall, political identification by the
professors bears a moderately strong relationship to the responses (Spearman's correlation
coefficient of 0.474 at a statistically significant level of 0.005). The responses of liberal
professors produced a moderately weak degree ofcorrelation at a non-statistically significant
level (Spearman's correlation coefficient of 0.272 at 0.260 level of statistical significance).
The responses of conservative professors produced a Spearman's correlation coefficient of
0.913 at a statistically significant 0.030. Of the professors aged 30 to 49,46.15% disagreed
with the statement, compared with 38.9% of the professors overall. Of the professors
reporting a taxable estate, 43.75% disagreed with the statement, while 25% of those with a
non-taxable estate disagreed with the statement.
71 See supra Figure 12 and text accompanying notes 43-44.
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Figure 21
Exemption Percentages of Percentages of
Practitioners Professors
$ 0 1.3% 0.0%
1- 250,000 0.4 0.0
250,001- 500,000 1.7 19.4















Mean Exemption73  $1,508,125 $1,213,235
The average exemption proposed by the professors is slightly more than
the $1 million that will take effect in the year 2006 under the TRA 1997
amendments. The practitioners proposed an exemption that is roughly 25%
greater.
Estate tax returns filed in 1997 reveal that 96.22% of returns
72 Six practitioners wanted exemptions in excess of $10,000,000. Twelve wanted
unlimited exemptions. The suggested exemptions were as follows: $12,000,000;
$20,000,000; $60,000,000; $100,000,000; $200,000,000; and $700,000,000.
73 The average does not include the responses suggesting an unlimited exemption,
which is a request for abolition, not a suggestion of an exemption otherwise retaining the
current system. To avoid skewing the average on account of a few, extremely large
proposals, I excluded the six suggested exemptions in excess of $10 million. If those six
exemptions are included, the average increases to $6,256,359.
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represented gross estates under $5 million,74 and 88.8% of returns
represented gross estates under $2.5 million. 5 Of the nontaxable returns
97.74% revealed gross estates under $5 million, and 91.94% reflected gross
estates under $2.5 million.76 Dramatically increasing the exemption would
remove a number of estates from the system. Based on the returns filed in
1997, the net estate tax and generation-skipping transfer tax lost on taxable
estates reporting a gross estate under $5 million would be more than $8.55
billion. That would leave $8.17 billion from taxable estates reporting a
gross estate over $5,000,000. If the exemption were placed at $2.5 million,
the net estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes lost would be $5.13
billion.77
Perhaps the responding practitioners suggested exemption levels
slightly below the wealth level of their typical client with the idea that
exemption increases would then have little effect on their professional
services income. The survey appears to support that explanation.
Practitioners reported that the average net worth of typical clients was
$2,234,192.78 " The average practitioners' proposed exemption is
$1,508,125. I also cross-tabulated the responses for the net worth of a
typical client with the size of the proposed exemption. This cross-
tabulation revealed that 115 (49%) of the 234 practitioners responding to
this question proposed an exemption below the net worth level of their
typical client.
Statement 6 "The federal wealth transfer tax should be strengthened
further, eliminating loopholes and increasing its coverage."
74 Barry W. Johnson & Jacob M. Mikow, Federal Estate Tax Returns, 1995-1997,
Table IC, reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 19 STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN
No. 1 69, 103 (Summer 1999).
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See Johnson & Mikow, supra note 74, at 108.
78 See supra Figure 8 and text accompanying note 36.
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Figure 22
Practitioners Professors
1. Strongly Disagree 33.3% 25%
2. Disagree 38.3 19.4
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 12.9 11.1
4. Agree 14.2 25.1
5. Strongly Agree 1.3 19.4
Average 1-5 ranking 2.12 2.94
More than 70% of practitioners disagreed with this statement, while
44% of the professors disagreed. Some scholarly writing provides support
for this statement.79 Liberal practitioners more strongly agreed with the
statement." Likewise, liberal professors more strongly agreed with the
statement. 8'
79 "Perhaps, the discussion of estate taxation might be focused more suitably on how
to clamp down on tax evaders and tax avoidance and on how to restore some sense of
fairness to the U.S. tax system." Edward N. Wolff, Commentary, Colloquium on Wealth
Transfer Taxation, 51 TAX L. REV. 517, 521 (1996). See also Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing
Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 73-74 (1990) (proposing the confiscation of all but
a modest inheritance).
80 In cross-tabulating with political identification, 11.61% of conservative practitioners
agreed with the statement, while 21.82% of the liberal practitioners agreed with the
statement. A Spearman's correlation of political identification and responses to the question
produced a moderately weak -0.223 correlation coefficient at a statistically significant 0.001.
The responses of liberal practitioners produced a Spearman's correlation coefficient of 0.268
at a statistically significant level 0.047. A cross-tabulation of the practitioners' responses
against their ages did not disclose a pattern. Of the practitioners aged 25 to 49, 70.75%
disagreed with the statement compared with 71.6% of the practitioners overall. In the same
age group, 16.04% agreed with the statement compared with 15.5% overall. Of the
practitioners reporting a taxable estate, 13.04% agreed with the statement. Of those with a
non-taxable estate, 15.65% agreed with the statement compared with 15.5% overall.
81 Of liberal professors, 52.63% agreed with the statement while none of the
conservative professors agreed with the statement. Overall, this produced a moderately
strong Spearman's correlation coefficient of -0.509 at a statistically significant level of
0.002. Focusing on liberal professors produced a Spearman's correlation coefficient of
-0.298, but it also disclosed a non-statistically significant level of 0.215. In both of these
cases the correlation is negative, because political identification is ranked on a 1-5 scale,
from liberal to conservative. Agreement is ranked on a 1-5 scale, from disagreement to
agreement. So a very liberal professor with a strong agreement would juxtapose a "1"
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1. Strongly Disagree 24.9% 27.8%
2. Disagree 34.8 25.0
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 24.9 25.0
4. Agree 13.7 11.1
5. StronglyAgree 1.7 11.1
Average 1-5 ranking 2.32 2.53
Practitioners did not strongly concur with this statement. The lack of
agreement may reflect the preponderance of male respondents. Only 11.4%
of the practitioners and 13.5% of the professors were females. 3
In a cross-tabulation of gender against responses to this statement,
14.08% of male practitioners agreed with the proposition, and 11.11% of
female practitioners agreed with it. Only 1.41% of male practitioners
strongly agreed with the statement, and 3.70% of female practitioner
against a "5," creating a negative correlation. Cases that fall between such extremes can
create apparently spurious or inconclusive results due to the imprecision of the simple
scaling. See supra note 52. Of the professors aged 30 to 49,23% agreed with the statement,
while 56.52% of the professors aged 50 to 80 agreed with the statement. Comparing age
with political identification disclosed that 66.67% of the professors aged 30 to 49 identified
themselves as politically liberal, while 47.83% of those aged 50 to 80 identified themselves
as liberal. Therefore, the difference in the age groups' reactions to the statement apparently
is not because the older professors are more liberal. Of the professors with taxable estates,
62.5% agreed with the statement, while only 25% of those with non-taxable estates agreed
with the statement.
82 This statement is a detour from the principal theme of this Article. I included it
because of recent commentary on this issue. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist
Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1729
(1998); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Illogical and Sexist QTIP Provisions: I Just Can 't Say It
Ain't So, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1597 (1998); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP
Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1995).
83 See supra Figure 4 and text accompanying note 33.
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strongly agreed with the statement. Among professors, 9.68% of male
professors agreed with the statement, and 20% of female professors agreed
with the statement. Of male professors, 6.45% strongly agreed with the
statement, and 40% of female professors strongly agreed.
A cross-tabulation of responses against political identification disclosed
that 15.18% of conservative practitioners agreed with Statement 7,
compared with the overall 15.40% agreement, although 20% of liberal
practitioners agreed with the statement. Among liberal professors, 31.58%
agreed with Statement 7 compared with 22.2% overall. None of the
conservative professors agreed with the statement.
Of the seven statements, practitioners and professors expressed the most
support for retaining the system, but increasing the amount of the
exemption." The average 1-5 ranking of practitioners was 3.46. For
professors, it was 3.11. Practitioners were highly enthusiastic about this
proposal. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198185 increased
exemptions, which some predicted would reduce the percentage of
decedents with taxable estates from 2.8% to 0.3%.16 The TRA 1997 also
increased exemptions. 7 For practitioners, increasing exemptions permits
the wealth transfer taxation system, and their livelihood, to continue
relatively unaffected. From a political standpoint, exemption increases
8 See supra Figure 20 and text accompanying notes 69-71.85 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,95 Stat. 172 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) amended I.R.C. § 2001 to reduce the top
marginal transfer tax rate from 70% to 50%. The legislation also amended I.R.C. § 2010 to
increase the unified credit from $47,000 (an exclusion amount of $175,625) in steps
ultimately to $192,800 (an exclusion amount of $600,000), amended I.R.C. § 2056 (and the
companion gift tax provision, I.R.C. § 2523) to provide for an unlimited marital deduction
between spouses, and amended I.R.C. § 2503 to increase the annual gift exclusion from
$3,000 to $10,000. For an explanation of the legislation see Gutman, supra note 2.86 See Gutman, supra note 2, at 1207-08.
87 TRA 1997 amended I.R.C. § 2010 to include a phased-in increase in the "applicable
credit amount" such that the exclusion for the estate of a decedent dying, and gifts made,
during 2006 or thereafter will reach $1,000,000. In addition, for years after 2007 the
$1,000,000 amount is subject to increase by a cost-of-living adjustment. See I.R.C. §
2010(c). TRA 1997 also amended I.R.C. §§ 2032A (valuation of farm and other property),
2503(b) (the $10,000 annual gift exclusion), and 2631 (the $1,000,000 generation skipping
transfer tax exemption) to include continuing adjustments to reflect cost-of-living increases
occurring after 1997.
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would probably relieve some of the pressure to repeal the system."8 On the
other hand, practitioners suggested an average proposed exemption of $1.5
million, which is only 25% greater than the $1.2 million mark set by the
professors who do not have the same financial stake in perpetuating wealth
transfer taxes.
3. Alternatives to the Current System
The first seven statements dealt with changing the existing system, thus
preserving the system's fundamental approach. However, critics have
proposed several forms of replacement. Accordingly, several statements in
the survey addressed alternatives.
Statement 8 "The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished, even if




1. Strongly Disagree 25.3% 25.0%
2. Disagree 33.2 36.1
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 14.5 5.6
4. Agree 17.0 19.4
5. Strongly Agree 10.0 13.9
Average 1-5 ranking 1 2.53 2.61
The professors favored this proposal slightly more than practitioners.
Conservative practitioners 9 and professors" more strongly supported the
88 Some critics view the TRA 1997 increases in the unified credit as only a "down
payment," and they seek further liberalization, or repeal. See sources cited supra note 4.
89 In a cross-tabulation of the responses with political identification, 35.71% of the
conservative practitioners agreed with the statement, while 12.73% of liberal practitioners
agreed with the statement. Overall, a Spearman's correlation coefficient of responses with
political identification was a moderately weak 0.208 at a statistically significant 0.001 level.
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statement.
This simple alternative to increase income tax rates would probably
burden the same group that is subject to the wealth transfer tax. However,
although estimates vary, higher income tax rates could be a greater
impediment to entrepreneurial activity than wealth transfer taxes, which are
discounted, subject to repeal or increased exemptions, and levied only
once.
91
Statement 9 "The federal wealth transfer tax should be eliminated, replaced
by inclusion of gifts and inheritances in taxable income."
The correlation of the responses of conservative practitioners with the responses is a weak
0.110 Spearman's correlation at a non-statistically significant level of 0.248. The correlation
of responses of only liberal practitioners was a moderately weak 0.264 at a barely non-
statistically significant level of 0.052. A cross-tabulation of the practitioners' responses
against their ages did not disclose a pattern. For the practitioners aged 25 to 49, 58.88%
disagreed with the statement compared with 58.5% of the practitioners overall. In the same
age group, 24.3% agreed compared with 27% overall. A cross-tabulation of the responses
disclosed that 29.31% of the practitioners reporting a taxable estate agreed with the
statement, while 25.22% of those reporting a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement.
90 Of the liberal professors, 31.58% approved of the statement, while 60% of the
conservative professors approved of the statement. However, only five professors make up
the conservative category, and that fact produced a weak Spearman's correlation coefficient
of 0.167 at a non-statistically significant level of 0.789. Of the professors aged 30 to 49,
30.77% approved of the statement, while 34.78% of the professors aged 50 to 80 approved
of the statement. Overall professor approval was 33.3%. Of the professors with a taxable
estate, 12.50% approved of the statement, while 56.25% of the professors with non-taxable
estates approved.
91 See Wayne M. Gazur, Congressional Diversions: Legislative Responses to the Estate
Valuation Freeze, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 95, 104 nn.52-53 (1989) (summarizing commentary
on the income tax versus wealth transfer tax effect on incentives). See also PATRICK
FLEENOR & J.D. FOSTER, AN ANALYSIS OF THE DISINCENTIVE EFFECTS OF THE ESTATE TAX
ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP 17 (Tax Foundation 1994) ("The various simulations conducted
using the model developed in this paper showed that the estate tax has roughly the same
effect on entrepreneurial incentives as a doubling of income tax rates.").
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Figure 25
Practitioners Professors
1. Strongly Disagree 49.1% 30.5%
2. Disagree 34.5 16.7
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 10.5 27.8
4. Agree 3.4 13.9
5. Strongly Agree 2.5 11.1
(Average 1-5 ranking 1.76 [ 2.58
At one time, this proposal received a substantial amount of scholarly
attention. 92 The professors' responses indicated some of that interest, but
only 25% agreed with the statement. 93 The practitioners are not enthusiastic
about this statement. 94
Statement 10 "I would support the elimination of the federal wealth
transfer tax even if the trade-off were implementation of some form of
carryover basis (e.g., repeal of I.R.C. § 1014) or taxation of accrued gains
at death."
92 See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and
Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978); Edward J. Gac & Sharon K. Brougham,
A Proposal for Restructuring the Taxation of Wealth Transfers: Tax Reform Redux?, 5
AKRON TAX J. 75 (1988).93 Of the professors aged 30 to 49,23.08% agreed with the statement. Of the professors
aged 50 to 80, 26.09% agreed with the statement. Of the liberal professors, 21.05% agreed
with the statement, while 20% of the conservative professors agreed with the statement. Of
the professors with a taxable estate, 12.50% agreed with the statement, while 37.50% of
those with a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement.94 Of practitioners aged 25 to 49, 87.74% disagreed with the statement compared with
83.7% of the practitioners overall. In the same age group, 1.89% agreed compared with
5.9% overall. Cross-tabulating the responses with political identification disclosed that
3.6% of conservative practitioners agreed with the statement, while 1.85% of liberal
practitioners agreed with the statement. Of practitioners with a taxable estate, 6.9% agreed
with the statement, and 5.3% of those with a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement.
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Figure 26
Practitioners Professors
1. Strongly Disagree 28.3% 16.7%
2. Disagree 30.3 22.2
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 16.3 19.4
4. Agree 16.3 27.8
5. Strongly Agree 8.8 13.9
Average 1-5 ranking 2.47 3.00
Although some scholars have embraced this approach, 95 the numbers no
longer support the claim that the bulk of federal wealth transfer tax
revenues could be replaced by the adoption of carryover basis for
decedents. In 1999 the estimated revenue loss due to the section 1014
"step-up in basis" rule is nearly $9.5 billion,9 6 while the 1996 federal estate
and gift tax collections totaled nearly $17.2 billion.97 In comparison, federal
estate and gift tax receipts were $7.2 billion in 1986,98 while the revenue
loss from the step-up in basis at death was $4.9 billion."
The practitioners ° were less supportive than the professors.'°'
95 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 51, at 110; Leonard E. Burman, Estate Taxes and the
Angel of Death Loophole, 76 TAx NOTES 675, 677 (1997); Joseph M. Dodge, Further
Thoughts on Realizing Gains and Losses at Death, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1827 (1994); Russell
K. Osgood, Carryover Basis Repeal and Reform of the Transfer Tax System, 66 CORNELL
L. REV. 297 (1981).
96 Tax Expenditures Chapter, supra note 11, at 925 tbl.5-3.
97 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 10, at 347 tbl. 551.
98 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ANN. REP. OF THE COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF COUNS.
OF THE I.R.S., reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.
302 tbl.487 (108th ed. 1988).
99 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOV'T, ANNUAL, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
U.S. 296 tbl.475 (108th ed. 1988).
100 A cross-tabulation of the practitioners' responses against their ages disclosed that
younger practitioners were more inclined to favor this statement. Of practitioners aged 25
to 49, 53.77% disagreed with the statement compared with 58.7% of the practitioners
overall. In the same age group, 28.3% agreed with the statement compared with 24% of the
practitioners overall. A cross-tabulation of the responses to political identification disclosed
that 28.57% of conservative practitioners agreed with the statement, while 16.36% of liberal
practitioners agreed with the statement. A cross-tabulation of the responses against personal
estate tax concerns revealed that 26.72% of the practitioners reporting a taxable estate
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1. Strongly Disagree 29.3% 42.8%
2. Disagree 29.3 34.3
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 18.4 14.3
4. Agree 14.6 2.9
5. Strongly Agree 8.4 5.7
Average 1-5 ranking 2.44 1.94
Professor McCaffery is one noted scholar who has proposed a
consumption tax as a substitute for the federal wealth transfer tax.'°2 More
than 58% of the practitioners disagreed with this statement. 3 An
overwhelming 77% of the professors also disagreed with the statement,
agreed with the statement, while 24.56% of those reporting a non-taxable estate agreed with
the statement. Note that individuals with a non-taxable estate get the best of both worlds
under the present system, that is (1) the section 1014 basis adjustment for income tax
purposes and (2) freedom from the federal wealth transfer tax.
101 Of the professors aged 30 to 49, 38.46% agreed with the statement, and 43.48% of
the professors aged 50 to 80 agreed with the statement. Of liberal professors, 47.37% agreed
with the statement, while 60% of conservative professors agreed with the statement. Of
those professors with a taxable estate, 18.75% agreed with the statement, while 68.75% of
those with a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement.
102 See Edward J. McCaffery, Estate Tax Reform: The (Moral) Case Against Carve-
outs, 79 TAX NOTES 122, 123-24 (1998) [hereinafter McCaffery, Estate Tax Reform];
Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L. J. 283
(1994) [hereinafter McCaffery, Wealth Transfer Taxation].
103 Cross-tabulating for political identification, 32.14% of conservative practitioners
agreed with the statement, and 10.9 1% of liberal practitioners agreed with the statement.
Overall, the relationship between political outlook and approval of the statement was
moderately weak with a Spearman's correlation coefficient of 0.208 at a statistically
significant level of 0.001. A cross-tabulation of the practitioners' responses against their
ages disclosed that older practitioners were slightly more in favor of this statement. Of
practitioners aged 50 to 100, 26.52% agreed with the statement compared with 23.0% of the
practitioners overall. Of practitioners reporting a taxable estate, 26.55% agreed with the
statement, while 19.13% of those reporting a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement.
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while only 8.6% agreed with it.'I
Comparing the results, more practitioners supported the proposal in
Statement 11 to replace wealth transfer taxes with a consumption-based tax,
than the proposal in Statement 9 to include wealth transfers in taxable
income. Roughly the same number of practitioners that agreed with
Statement 11 agreed with the proposal in Statement 10 to adopt carryover
basis. Professors agreed with Statement 10 the most. Statement 11 was
clearly their least favorite option.
Statement 12 "If a consumption-based tax were adopted, it should
incorporate a progressive rate structure."
Figure 28
Practitioners Professors
1. Strongly Disagree 22.4% 11.1%
2. Disagree 22.8 2.8
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 27.8 16.7
4. Agree 20.7 36.1
5. Strongly Agree 6.3 33.3
Average 1-5 ranking 2.66 3.78
Among conservative practitioners, 15.32% agreed with the statement,
while 47.27% of liberal practitioners agreed with the statement.'05 The law
104 Of the professors aged 30 to 49, 23.08% agreed with the statement, while none of
the professors aged 50 to 80 agreed with the statement. Of liberal professors, 5.56% agreed
with the statement, while none of the conservative professors agreed with the statement. Of
the professors with a taxable estate, none agreed with the statement, while 18.75% of those
with a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement.
105 A cross-tabulation of the practitioners' responses against their ages disclosed no
significant differences. Of practitioners aged 50 to 100, 42.75% disagreed with the
statement compared with 45.2% of the practitioners overall. In the same age group, 26.72%
agreed with the statement compared with 27% of the practitioners overall. Cross-tabulating
the responses against personal estate tax concerns disclosed that 27.19% of practitioners
reporting a taxable estate agreed with the statement, and 26.55% of practitioners reporting
a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement.
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professors emphatically favored a progressive tax rate structure, with
84.21% of liberal professors agreeing with the statement.
0 6
In summary of the responses to the alternatives to the current system,
the professors most favored Statement 10, which provided for carryover
basis, or taxation of gains at death. The average 1-5 ranking on this issue
for practitioners was 2.47. For professors, it was 3.0.107 The practitioners
slightly favored Statement 8, which provided for an increase in upper
marginal income tax rates. Notably, this was also the second most favored
statement by professors. The average 1-5 ranking for practitioners was
2.53. For professors, it was 2.61.10
Comparing the proposals to replace the system with the proposals to
modify the system, the proposal in Statement 5 to increase the general
exemption won the highest level of approval from practitioners and tied the
highest level for professors. 19 The average 1-5 ranking for practitioners
was 3.46. For professors, it was 3.11. Because the practitioners' practices
would be largely unaffected, and the professors cannot agree on other
alternatives, adjusting the status quo appears to be the prevailing view.
106 Professor McCaffery's consumption tax proposal "could feature progressive
marginal rates." See McCaffery, Estate Tax Reform, supra note 102, at 124. Of
conservative professors, 20% agreed with the statement. The Spearman's correlation
coefficient for the responses of all professors against their political identification produced
a moderately strong correlation of-0.580 at a statistically significant 0.000. The Spearman's
correlation coefficient for liberal professors' answers was a -0.315 correlation coefficient
at a non-statistically significant level of 0.188. No age-related pattern appeared to result.
Of the professors aged 30 to 49, 76.92% agreed with the statement, while 65.22% of the
professors aged 50 to 80 agreed with the statement. Of those professors with a taxable
estate, 81.25% agreed with the statement, and 62.50% of those with a non-taxable estate
agreed with the statement.
107 See supra Figure 26 and text accompanying notes 95-99. This support for
enactment of a carryover basis solution was echoed by the 106th Congress. In that regard
the 1999 Act vetoed by President Clinton on September 23, 1999 would have adopted a
modified carryover basis regime to supplant the wealth transfer taxes effective for years
following December 31, 2008. See supra note 4 for a brief description of the legislation.
108 See supra Figure 24 and text accompanying notes 89-91.
'09 See supra Figure 20 and text accompanying notes 69-71. The professors gave the
same approval ranking of 3.11 to Statement 2, which was that the federal wealth transfer tax
should be abolished because the costs of administration and taxpayer compliance exceed
revenue. See supra Figure 17 and text accompanying notes 54-59.
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The incrementalism proposal is not profound or new. Legislative
behavior in the federal wealth transfer tax area is incrementalist in nature.
If a pattern is discernible, it is one of patchwork amendments.
... The frequent but largely technical tinkering with the statutory
language may, in part, also be reflective of the legislative
"incrementalism" best demonstrated by the income tax.
Incrementalism would also explain the tax reduction bias in
recent legislation....
If legislative incrementalism is a factor in wealth transfer
taxation, fundamental changes to the wealth transfer taxation
system may be too radical at this time .... The commentators who
advocate incremental changes to the current system, an example
being the American Bar Association proposals, have perhaps
correctly appraised the political realities."0
C. Focusing on Family Businesses
Owners of family businesses, including family farms, have been
extremely vocal in debates over federal wealth transfer taxes."' These
owners are appealing candidates for exemptions from wealth transfer taxes
because they may not represent the entrenched, inherited wealth that the
federal wealth transfer taxes system seems to target. In The Millionaire
Next Door, the authors portray the typical millionaire as a hardworking,
frugal, self-employed, small business owner who is the first generation to
be wealthy." 2  The authors argue that millionaires fit the following
description: only 19% receive income or wealth from a trust fund or estate;
fewer than 20% inherited 10% or more of their wealth; more than half did
not inherit any wealth; fewer than 25% received $10,000 or more from
parents, grandparents, or other relatives; 91% did not receive the ownership
of a family business as a gift; and fewer than 10% believe they will inherit
110 Gazur, supra note 91, at 99-101.
111 See sources cited supra note 8.
112 See THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM D. DANKO, THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR 7-
11(1996).
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in the future."'
While these statistics portray millionaires as self-made, the statistics
also suggest that the wealth transfer tax did not impair their success.
Simply stated, an inheritance, including an inheritance of a family business,
was not a factor in the creation of the typical millionaire's successful
business. The statistics on gifts of interests in the family business, coupled
with other possible parental concerns," 4 raise some questions about the
dynamics of family business succession apart from the wealth transfer tax
issues. Except for the argument that wealth transfer taxes sap the
entrepreneurial desire of the first generation," 5 the impassioned talk about
saving family businesses actually may be about preserving family wealth
for the next generation.
1. The Impact of Wealth Transfer Taxes on Family Businesses
Several statements and questions in the survey reflected opinions and
perceptions of the impact of the federal wealth transfer tax on family
businesses. Because practitioners are directly involved with planning issues
across a broad spectrum of client circumstances, their opinions about these
issues are particularly valuable.
Statement 13 "The federal wealth transfer tax is a significant obstacle to the
continuation of family businesses."
'13 See id. at 16.
114 Stanley and Danko contend that many business people want their children to
become professionals, rather than carry on the family business. See id. at 235-37; infra text
accompanying note 138.
1S See supra text accompanying note 51.
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Figure 29
Practitioners Professors
1. Strongly Disagree 6.2% 13.9%
2. Disagree 29.5 36.1
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 13.3 13.9
4. Agree 32.7 25.0
5. Strongly Agree 18.3 11.1
Average 1-5 ranking 3.27 2.83
The practitioners, especially conservatives, expressed stronger support
for this statement than the professors. 16 Likewise, conservative professors
expressed stronger support for this statement." 7 The apparent relationship
between the answers and political viewpoints is disturbing because it
suggests that other objective questions in the survey may be affected.
However, this result is not surprising because politics play a significant part
in the debate. The popular press is a prime example.
More than 51% of the practitioners agreed with Statement 13 that the
wealth transfer tax is a significant obstacle to the continuation of family
businesses. Other studies have addressed this issue. For example, in March
116 Cross-tabulating the responses against political identification, 68.14% of the
conservative and 33.33% of the liberal practitioners agreed with the statement. A
Spearman's correlation of the responses to political identification produced a moderately
weak 0.302 correlation coefficient at a statistically significant 0.000. A cross-tabulation of
the practitioners' responses against their ages disclosed slightly more approval of this
statement by younger practitioners. Of practitioners aged 25 to 49, 31.48% disagreed with
the statement compared with 35.7% of the practitioners overall. In the same age group,
55.56% agreed with the statement compared with 51.1% of the practitioners overall. Of
those practitioners reporting a taxable estate, 60.34% agreed with the statement, while
42.61% of those reporting a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement.
117 Of liberal professors, 21.05% agreed with the statement, while 80% of the five
conservative professors agreed with the statement. For all professors, the responses
produced a Spearman's correlation to political identity of 0.408 at a statistically significant
0.017. Focusing only on liberal professors, the correlation was a moderately strong 0.519
at a statistically significant 0.023. Of the professors aged 30 to 49, 53.85% agreed with the
statement, while 26.09% of those aged 50 to 80 agreed with the statement. Of the professors
with a taxable estate, 18.75% agreed with the statement, while 50% of those with a non-
taxable estate agreed with the statement.
FALL 1999
34 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
and April of 1995, the Center for the Study of Taxation sponsored Travis
Research Associates in a national mail survey of more than 2,500 family
businesses.III The survey asked participants to rank the potential impact of
federal estate taxes on their business. The scale ranged from 1-10, and a 10
ranking indicated that the potential impact was a major concern. The
participants gave the following rankings: 42% chose 10, 9% picked 9, 16%
chose 8, 7% marked 7, 5% picked 6, 10% chose 5, 3% marked 3, 2% chose
2, and 3% indicated 1. "' The mean was 7.9. Of the 2,529 respondents, 426
also provided an estimate of the amount of federal estate tax that could be
levied on their business. The mean amount was $2,300,000, and the median
amount was $900,000.120
In Statement 13, I used the phrase "significant obstacle" to describe the
impact of the wealth transfer tax. To quantify the proportion of situations
in which the wealth transfer tax would have such an effect, I also asked the
following question: "In your experience, in what percentage of family
business situations would the imposition of the federal wealth transfer tax
have a significant effect on the long-term survival of the business (assuming
the use of customary planning techniques such as life insurance, gifting,
valuation discounts, etc.)?"''
118 See TRAVIS RESEARCH ASSOC., CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF TAXATION, FEDERAL
ESTATE TAX IMPACT SURVEY 3 (1995) [hereinafter IMPACT SURVEY]. The survey did not
randomly select its subjects from all family businesses, but focused on several industry
groups such as construction (33%), transportation (18%), and contractors (28%). See id. at
32.
119 See id. at 8-9.
120 See id. at 9.
121 The question for professors was slightly different. It began with the phrase "[a]s
your estimate, in approximately what percentage ...."
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Figure 30





















Mean Percentage of 36.18% 25.56%
Family Business
I included the parenthetical about avoidance techniques for clarity, but
it also indicates flaws in the system. Many people avoid wealth transfer
taxes through creative planning. Professor Cooper's planning tools are
exotic examples, 22 but the system practically demands gimmicks like the
irrevocable life insurance trust or the "A-B trust" for married couples with
barely more than $625,000 in assets. Those who propose a less elective tax,
as well as those who deplore pointless transaction costs, can find fault with
122 See Cooper, supra note 29, at 161.
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a system that encourages this kind of game-playing. Life insurance
companies, estate planners, and charities drive the development of estate
planning techniques. For example, in the estate tax survey sponsored by the
Center for the Study of Taxation, the most common planning technique was
the purchase of life insurance (62%), followed by the use of buy-sell
agreements (39%), lifetime gifts of stock (28%), business restructuring or
formation of family partnerships (20%), charitable bequests of interests in
the family business (4%), and other techniques (9%).123 Of those businesses
that had taken such steps, 62% of owners stated that they would not have
done so if the estate tax did not exist.
24
The results of my question about the impact of federal wealth transfer
taxes on the long-term survival of family businesses is especially interesting
in comparison to the results of a similar question in the survey by the Center
for the Study of Taxation. The business owners in that survey answered the
following question: "Taking into consideration [the steps taken to minimize
the potential impact of the tax], what would be the likely effect of the
federal estate tax on the long term survival of the family business after the
death of the current principal owner(s)?"'125 Only 10% responded that the
tax would not affect the continuation of the business, 25% responded that
the tax would make it slightly more difficult to continue, 51% said that it
would make it significantly more difficult, and 14% answered that it would
make it impossible.'26 Accordingly, 65% responded that the tax would
probably hurt their business or force them to close down.'27
These surveys reveal a great disparity in perceptions of the effect the
federal estate tax has on the survival of family businesses. In my survey,
an average of 36% of practitioners thought that the system threatened the
123 See IMPACT SURVEY, supra note 118, at 10-11. The percentage of respondents that
took no planning steps was 19%.
124 See id.
125 See IMPACT SURVEY, supra note 118, at app. 3.
1
2 6 See IMPACT SURVEY, supra note 118, at 13.
127 See id. Thirty percent of family businesses in the Center for the Study of Taxation
survey stated that they would likely have to sell all or part of the business to pay the estate
taxes. See id. at 14. However, the Center prefaced the question with the following
statement: "In many cases, estate taxes must be paid in cash, as soon as nine months after
death." Id. at app. 3. By omitting a discussion of I.R.C. § 6166 installment payment plans,
this question probably created the misperception that a fire sale would be required.
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survival of family businesses, and 26% of the professors perceived a threat.
Compare those percentages with the 65% estimate of the business owners
in the Center for the Study of Taxation survey. Anecdotal evidence of this
tax burden feeds the perception. 28
This difference in opinion is not unusual for this issue. The popular
press and political debates are ripe with dire predictions and broad claims.
Karen Kerrigan of the Small Business Survival Committee
estimates that 90 per cent of family businesses that close after the
death of the founder do so because heirs cannot pay the estate tax
without liquidating the business. That's bad for everybody; 78 per
cent of all new jobs created in the U.S. are spawned in family
businesses, according to the Center for the Study of Taxation. 29
Some claims are somewhat misleading. One writer stated that: "[t]he
Wall Street Journal reported on Aug. 4, 1988, that only 30 percent of family
businesses survive the death of the founder. Failure to prepare qualified
successor management, family squabbles and liquidity shortages caused by
estate taxes contribute to this figure. Estate taxes continue to haunt the
small business owner."'
' 30
However, that Wall Street Journal article did not discuss the estate tax
or even use the word "tax." The article is about family business succession
and the struggles that parents face to decide which of the children should
assume control of the family enterprise. The statistical discussion was
merely the statement that "[o]nly about 30% of family businesses outlive
their founders, usually for lack of planning. And with many founders of the
large number of small companies started in the post-World War II boom
now reaching retirement age, the question of succession is becoming more
128 See, e.g., Lee Berton, Enterprise, Inheritance Tax is Choking Successors to Family
Firms-Removal of Estate-Tax Freeze Puts Big Burden on Small Business, WALL ST. J.
Aug. 23, 1989 at B2 (giving the accounts of several family businesses facing large estate tax
bills).
129 Ed Rubenstein, Right Data, NAT'L REV., June 30, 1997, at 17.
130 Tom Waters, Gifts Create Legacy and Protect Assets, DENW. Bus. J. May 9-15,
1997, at 18B. The estate tax often has a silver lining for someone. Mr. Waters is "a director
of planned giving for Porter Care Hospitals-Centura Health." Id.
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pressing."3'
While the estate tax is a concern, it is probably not the principal concern
of the owners of closely held businesses. The Wall Street Journal reported
a survey by Nancy Bowman-Upton of Baylor University on the family
succession issue.' She found that 31% of business owners were most
concerned about treating all children fairly. Other concerns included the
reaction of non-family employees (22%); family communication conflict
(20%); and estate taxes (20%).
Family business owners probably feel a level of apprehension about the
impact of wealth transfer taxes that is unfounded in light of the actual
impact of taxes. This misperception may drive unneeded planning and the
emotional movement to repeal wealth transfer taxes. The Center for the
Study of Taxation asked its survey participants the following question: "To
date, has there been the death of a family owner that has adversely affected
the business due to the imposition of estate taxes?"' 33 Surprisingly, only 7%
responded "yes."' 134  That is a dramatic result considering the dire
predictions about the effect of estate taxes in other survey responses.
Moreover, the question asked only whether businesses had been "adversely
affected," which is mild language compared with terms like impossibility,
devastating, or confiscatory. 35 Arguably, any tax paid is an adverse result.
Of the family businesses responding, 51% were the first generation. Thus,
they probably had not dealt with the issue yet. However, the remaining
49% of respondents included 31% who were second generation, 15% who
were third generation, and 3% who were fourth generation.
36
131 Buck Brown, Succession Strategies for Family Firms, WALL ST. J. Aug. 4, 1988,
at 23.
132 See John R. Emshwiller, The Entrepreneurial Cycle, The Next Generation: Handing
Down the Business, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1989, at Bi.
133 IMPACT SURVEY, supra note 118, at app. 3.
134 See id. at 17.
135 See id. at app. 3.
136 See id. at 25.
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2. The Role of Non-Tax Factors in the Continuation of the Family
Business
I included one question in the survey to address the ability or interest
of the next generation to continue the family businesses. Practitioners and
professors responded to the following question: "In your experience, in
what percentage of family business situations do members of the next

























Mean Percentage of 39.12% 39.65%
Family Businesses
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I designed this question to address the role of other non-tax factors in
the longevity of family businesses. The responses were consistent with the
widely varied results of the survey's other questions about the impact of the
estate tax on the continuation of the family businesses. The survey results
suggest that the younger generation's lack of interest is the primary reason
many family businesses fail to continue into subsequent generations.
In commenting on studies that show that only 35%' of family
businesses survived through the second generation and only 20% remained
successful in the third generation, an attorney with over thirty years'
experience in estate planning observed that:
Much of this has to be laid at the doorstep of the managerial skills
of the second generation of management. But from the writer's
personal observations, this low rate is due even more to the lack of
drive in the second generation of managers to succeed, coupled
with their desire to consume the financial assets of the business....
There is also the matter of the "trapped child." This is the member
of the second generation who is primarily in the business to please
his or her parents and has no commitment beyond that objective.'3
The Center for the Study of Taxation asked respondents in its survey
whether the next generation was interested in continuing to operate the
family business. An overwhelming majority, 73% answered that the next
generation was interested. 39 This percentage is much higher than the 39%
estimate of both practitioners and professors in my survey.
Compare the anecdotal observations in The Millionaire Next Door.
If you're like most successful business owners, you will advise
[the children] to become professionals. So it is with the affluent in
137 Compare this percentage to the results in Figure 31, which indicates a mean of 39%.
131 Stephen B. Hill, How to Succeed at Estate Planning Without Destroying the
Business and/or the Family, PRAC. TAX LAW, Winter 1998, at 5, 7. In the survey conducted
by Nancy Bowman-Upton of Baylor University that was reported in the Wall Street Journal,
children most often gave the following reasons for entering family business: make money-
67%; like the business-50%; good career opportunity-43%; family influence-40%; and help
family-39%. See Emshwiller, supra note 132, at B I.
139 See IMPACT STUDY, supra note 118, at app. 3.
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America. The first-generation affluent are typically entrepreneurs.
They beat the odds. Their businesses succeed, and they become
affluent....
Their children will have it better. They will not have to take
significant risks. They will be well educated. They will become
physicians, attorneys, and accountants. 4
Some participants in the wealth transfer tax debate have an exaggerated
perception of the overall impact of the federal wealth transfer taxes on
family businesses. Therefore, I asked both the practitioners and professors
the following question: "As your estimate, what percentage of gross estates
(in which a federal estate tax return is filed) is represented by family farms
or closely-held businesses?" Additionally, the practitioners answered the
following question: "What percentage of the gross estates (in which a
federal estate tax return is filed) of your clients is typically represented by
family farms or closely-held businesses?"
Figure 32
Practitioners
Family Farm or Taxpayer Their Own Professors
Closely Held Estates Clients'
Business Clients Overall Estates
0- 5% 12.6% 16.5% 5.9%
6-10 18.6 11.4 29.4
11-20 19.9 8.9 23.5
21- 30 16.0 14.8 20.6
31-40 13.4 15.7 5.9
41-50 10.0 10.2 11.8
51-70 5.2 11.9 0.0
71-80 3.0 5.5 2.9
81- 90 0.4 3.0 0.0
91-100 0.9 2.1 0.0
Mean Percentage of 24.90% 32.58% 21.06%
Gross Estates
140 STANLEY & DANKO, supra note 112, at 235-37.
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Based on 1997 estate tax returns, about 8% of the gross assets in taxable
estates are comprised of family farms and small businesses.' 4' Practitioners
in this survey may deal with more family farms and small businesses than
the overall statistics suggest. Nevertheless, the practitioners and professors
overstated the overall impact of family businesses on the estate planning
practice by at least 230% to 280%.
This kind of overstatement can influence the debate over wealth transfer
taxes. For example, Harry Gutman argued that the loud complaints of the
family business and farm lobbies during the deliberations over the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 tended to bubble over into the larger
debate.'42 He believed politicians used the ordeals of the family business
to generate larger exemptions for all estates. In that regard, the current
debate is focused on the complete repeal of wealth transfer taxes and the
rest of the Internal Revenue Code, rather than exemptions crafted to meet
the family business concerns. 14 3 Ironically, the relatively small stake of
family businesses in the total wealth transfer tax picture, compared to the
volume of criticism, makes additional exemptions for family businesses a
pragmatic political solution. Accordingly, I designed several questions of
the survey to address proposals for a special exemption for family
businesses.
3. Proposing an Exemption for Family Businesses
Statement 14 "I would support an expanded exemption for family
businesses, preserving, however, the estate tax for other types of assets."
1
4 1 Noncorporate business assets were $705,585,000 for taxable returns, and farm assets
were $255,875,000 for taxable returns. Closely held stock assets were $6,901,834,000.
These assets totaled $7,863,294,000. This calculation omits the category of limited
partnerships that could include some family business assets, which was worth
$1,961,061,000. On the other hand, the estimate ignores $2,933,932,000 in debts and
mortgages, some of which could pertain to (and decrease) noncorporate business assets.
Compared with the taxable estate amount for taxable returns of $89,035,200,000, the
percentage of the small business and farm assets would be 8.83%. If one made the
comparison to gross assets of taxable estates, which was $97,650,463,000, the percentage
of small business and farm assets would be 8.05%. Johnson & Mikow, supra note 74, at
103-108.
1
4 2 See Gutman, supra note 2, at 1197-1202.
143 See sources cited supra note 4.
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Figure 33
Practitioners Professors
Strongly Disagree 10.5% 29.4%
Disagree 34.0 35.3
Neither Agree nor Disagree 15.1 20.6
Agree 35.8 14.7
Strongly Agree 4.6 0.0
Average 1-5 ranking 2.90 2.20
The practitioners were almost equally divided in their responses to this
statement. 144 However, the professors were not enthusiastic about the
creation of additional subsidies for specific businesses or assets, 145 and only
14.7% agreed with the statement.1
46
As a related inquiry, the survey included the following question: "The
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 creates an additional exemption under newly
144 Of practitioners aged 25 to 49,40.95% disagreed with the statement compared with
44.5% of practitioners overall. In the same age group, 43.81% agreed with the statement
compared with 40.3% of practitioners overall. Cross-tabulating for political identification,
39.09% of conservative practitioners and 46.3% of liberal practitioners agreed with the
statement. Although support for an exemption by liberal practitioners appears counter-
intuitive, an explanation may be that the other portion of the question called for retention of
the wealth transfer taxes. In other words, the liberals' enthusiasm for retaining the system
may explain their unexpected support for an expanded exemption for family businesses. Of
practitioners reporting a taxable estate, 36.52% agreed with the statement, and 44.25%
reporting a non-taxable estate agreed with the statement.
145 Commentators have criticized Section 2032A, which contains special valuation rules
for farms. See, e.g., Neil E. Harl, Does Farm and Ranch Property Need a Federal Estate
and Gift Tax Break?, 68 TAX NOTES 875 (1995); Roland L. Hjorth, Special Estate Tax
Valuation ofFarmland and the Emergence ofa Landholding Elite Class, 53 WASH. L. REv.
609 (1978).
146 Of the professors age 30-49, 25% agreed with the statement, and 9.09% of the
professors aged 50 to 80 agreed with the statement. Of the liberal professors, 17.65% agreed
with the statement, while 40% of the conservative professors agreed with the statement. Of
the professors with taxable estates, 6.25% agreed with the statement, while 20% of those
with non-taxable estates agreed with the statement.
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enacted I.R.C. § 2033A'47 for family businesses in which at least 50% of the
business is owned by the decedent and members of the decedent's family
(or 70% is owned by two families, or 90% is owned by three families). In
your view, what should be the amount of that exemption?"
Figure 34
Exemption Amount Practitioners Professors
$ 0 18.5% 42.7%













More than 10,500,000 1.814s 0.0
Unlimited 4.5 2.9
Mean Exemption 14 [ $2,798,349 $816,176
147 The questionnaire referred to the former section 2033A. Congress has amended and
redesignated this section as section 2057. See I.R.S. Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 6007, 112 Stat. 685, 807. Although the 1998 legislation made some
technical changes to the statute, the changes do not affect the validity of the survey
comments. See id.
148 The exemptions in excess of $10,500,000 were $15,000,000, $20,000,000,
$25,000,000, $40,000,000, and $100,000,000.
149The mean does not include the unlimited exemptions because those numbers are not
ascertainable. Also, respondents apparently intended most of the unlimited exemptions as
a call for abolition. However, that was not always the case. One participant wrote
"$10,000,000 or unlimited." That response was compiled as unlimited, but the context
suggests that complete abolition of the system was not the goal. Another participant wrote
"unlimited-as long as family continues to operate business for minimum period (i.e. 10
years)." If the computation does not include exemptions in excess of$10,500,000, the mean
exemption is $1,890,625.
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Notably, almost half of the professors supported no exemption. Only
a small percentage of practitioners and professors supported an unlimited
exemption.
Practitioners and professors answered the following additional question:
"If you were designing an exemption for family businesses, what ownership
or participation criteria would you use? (circle all that apply.)
1. The newly enacted I.R.C. § 2033A parameters
2. Legal control of voting stock
3. Effective control of strategic directions




1. I.R.C. § 2033A parameters 25.4% 23.7%
2. Legal control 25.4 11.8
3. Effective control 12.4 8.8
4. Founder's descendant 2.2 2.9
6. Combinations of 1-4 19.8 17.6
7. I.R.C. § 6166 parametersT50  1.3 0.0
8. No exemption 5.3 14.7
9. Misc. other 8.2 20.5
Both practitioners and professors embraced the I.R.C. § 2033A
parameters, 5 ' which more clearly define measures of family control and
So See I.R.C. § 6166 (West Supp. 1999) (establishing the ownership criteria of a
closely held corporation that are necessary to qualify for the extension of time for an estate
taxpayer).
151 Critics attacked this section from the outset.
The recently enacted Sec. 2033A, which was seen by some as saving family
owned businesses from the scourge of death taxes, is now, as individuals gain a
better understanding of it, seen by many as window dressing .... In fact, several
groups, including the American Bar Association's Real Property and Probate
Section, have called for repeal of section 2033A since its complex provisions
make it applicable to only a few family-owned businesses and, even then, the
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legal control of voting stock. The survey participants found effective
control of strategic directions less appealing, and they did not like the
option of the founder's descendant as CEO.
The Code contains somewhat narrow definitions of closely held or
family businesses in its exemption provisions. Essentially, the exemptions
apply to closely held family businesses, rather than publicly held companies
that a family controls. 52 Furthermore, even if the business is closely held
and not publicly traded, the exemption is limited.5 3 These exemptions are
the product of political compromises that generally target the Main Street,
rather than Wall Street, family businesses described in The Millionaire Next
Door.54 For example, I.R.C. § 6166 requires 20% or more of the value of
the voting stock in a corporation to be included in the value of the
decedent's gross estate, and the corporation must have fifteen or fewer
shareholders. 15  Recently enacted I.R.C. § 2057 (formerly I.R.C. § 2033A)
requires the decedent and the decedent's family to own no less than 30% or
as much as 50% of the entity. 56 It also expressly excludes stock that is
"readily tradable on an established securities market or secondary
market."' 57
In considering an exemption for family businesses, people may have an
overly broad view of what constitutes a family business. For example,
relief provided is minimal.
Charles D. Fox, To Repeal or Not to Repeal: Is It An Issue?, TR. & EST., Jan. 1998, at 30.
One of the practitioners in this survey also criticized the provision in the open-ended
comments. "The QFBE [is] unworkable and impractical, of little need.... Poor businesses
need more help than the QFBE can provide." The attacks prompted Congress to make the
amendments that resulted in the section's redesignation as I.R.C. § 2057.
152 This distinction is not profound, but debates of this type overlook the basic truth that
humans own all property, and all humans are part of a family group. To use family
ownership as the sole criterion is too broad.
'5' See I.R.C. § 2032A (1994) (limiting the reduction in the valuation of real estate of
closely held businesses, principally agricultural properties, to $750,000); I.R.C. § 2057
(West Supp. 1999) (providing a $675,000 deduction for family-owned business interests);
and I.R.C. § 66010) (West Supp. 1999) (limiting the special 2% interest rate on deferred
estate tax payments for closely held business interests by a computation applying a
$1,000,000 limit).
'54 See STANLEY & DANKO, supra note 112.
115 See I.R.C. § 6166(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1998).
156 See id. § 2057(e)(1).
151 Id. § 2057 (e)(2)(B).
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14.6% of the practitioners would use effective control or the founder's
descendant as a corporate functionary as a criterion for a family business
exemption. Such a broad criterion could include numerically small, but
controlling, stock positions in public companies, as well as family
figureheads in control of public companies. Therefore, I included the
following question to elicit perceptions about the boundaries of family
businesses: "As your estimate, what percentage of publicly held companies
are 'family' businesses (i.e., where a descendant of the founding family is
a key officer, director, or owner, 4-5% or more of the voting stock is held
by a family or group of families; inside and outside representation by the
family on the board of directors)?"
Figure 36
Public Companies Practitioners Professors
that are Family
Businesses








Mean Percentage of 13.66% 9.79%
Companies
In another study sponsored by the Center for the Study of Taxation, the
authors used underlying studies to combine definitions of family.' Using
158 Joseph Astrachan & Melissa Carey, Family Businesses in the U.S. Economy 18
(unpublished presentation to the Center for the Study of Taxation on file with the author).
One study defined a family business as one "that involved a member from at least the second
generation who was a descendant of the founding family and who was a key officer, director
or owner." Id. Another study defined family business as "one in which the CEO, President,
or Chairperson is a descendant of the founding family." Id. A third study used "(1) 4-5%
or more of the voting stock held by a family or group of families, or one affluent individual;
(2) inside or outside representation on the part of the family on the board of directors,
generally over a long period of time." Id.
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those multiple criteria, they concluded that 37% of the 1992 Fortune 500
list and 21% of the Business Week 1000 list are family businesses) 59 They
also estimated that 60% of the 54,000 public companies identified by the
National Association of Securities Dealers are under family control."6
If these definitions and estimates are accurate, they indicate that both
the survey practitioners and professors have vastly underestimated the
extent of family ownership in public businesses. If Congress expands
exemptions for family businesses, the focus must be on the meaning of
family.
IV. OPEN-ENDED RESPONSES
I solicited general comments about the wealth transfer tax system so
respondents could provide comments without the constraints of the survey
format. Thirty-nine of the 250 practitioners and seven of the thirty-seven
professors offered comments.
A. Bias
Practitioner number 005 stated that the questionnaire is "biased and one
sided." Practitioner number 083 echoed that opinion and noted that many
believe that Congress should abolish the system and not replace it with
anything. This respondent argued that supply side economics suggests that
eliminating the estate tax will cause more growth in the economy and
increase income tax revenues accordingly. Therefore, no new or higher
taxes are required.
The questions were compound by design. If the question asked about
simple abolition without giving a reason or an alternative, the responses
would not reveal as much. However, one question did reflect a supply side
argument.161
159 See id.
'60 Seeid. at 19.
161 See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
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B. Abolition
Practitioner number 048 would abolish the wealth transfer tax by
including gifts in the income tax base with five-year retroactive averaging,
unless Congress adopts a flat tax. This respondent also advocated a
deferred payment of income taxes, with interest, for sudden increases in
wealth. Practitioner number 063 suggested eliminating the transfer tax and
the section 1014 basis adjustment. Additionally, this practitioner thought
the system should subject gifted and inherited property to a long-term
capital gains tax at 150% of the standard capital gains rate. Several
practitioners, including numbers 038, 087, 118, and 120, responded that
they would abolish the tax or limit it to large estates by reducing the
maximum rate. The majority of respondents that provided comments would
abolish or otherwise change the system, although some wrote in favor of the
system in wealth distribution terms.
C. Modifications
Several practitioners, including numbers 035 and 180, proposed a
transferable unified credit to avoid the need for family trusts. Few
commentors were happy about the current system, although changes that
eliminate or further reduce wealth transfer taxes could endanger their
livelihoods. Practitioner number 194 summed up a lot of the frustration that
was evident in other answers:
I think we have all the clever and able people on the wrong side
of the tax planning issue. Most tax lawyers I know are smart,
honest people. I think it is a real tragedy in the United States that
we have all these smart tax lawyers devoting all this fabulous
energy and ingenuity into saving taxes. Can you imagine how
wonderful it would be if we could somehow shift all this brilliant
creative energy over to the other side of the equation and had these
clever people trying to figure out how to spend the money we raise
from taxes instead of the professional lobbyists, bureaucrats, and
idiots who get themselves elected to Congress by "buying votes"
through new deficit financed social welfare give-aways.
Most professors expressed comments about changing the system, but
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stopped short of saying they wanted to abolish it. Some expressed the
sentiment that Congress should fix, or even abolish, the system to give
serious attention to taxing transferred wealth. Others made lists of specific




A. Transaction Costs and Incremental Reforms
The survey responses dealing with the impact of the TRA 1997
changes, such as the increase in the unified credit, suggest that the changes
will have little impact on estate planning revenues and the need for tax-
driven estate planning. This indicates that reduced transaction costs
probably will not materialize.
B. The Financial Impact of Repeal
Although the respondents predicted that incremental changes such as
the TRA 1997 will have little impact on attorney estate planning revenues,
they also predicted that a repeal of wealth transfer taxes could cut an
attorney's estate planning revenues by almost half.
C. Incrementalism (Muddling Along) Triumphs
Based on the responses to modification questions, the practicing bar
apparently does not embrace many of the longstanding scholarly proposals,
particularly those based on income tax solutions. Overall, the practicing bar
appears content to allow the system to continue with modifications, like
increases in the overall exemption. Among practitioners, the proposal that
received the most support was retaining wealth transfer taxes with increases
in the unified credit. That modification preserves the estate planner's
livelihood while also relieving some of the political steam for repeal.
Among professors, no consensus exists as to the direction or form of
reform, although eliminating the wealth transfer tax system along with
162 See Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
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section 1014 gained the most approval.I63
D. The General Political Outlook Influenced the Survey Results
Although I tried to capture other variables such as age, the taxability of
the participants' estates, and political identification, the respondents'
general political outlook appeared to be the most influential factor.
E. Expect Additional Family Business Exemptions
Practitioners offered significant support for special exemptions for
family businesses, although the professors were less generous. Among both
groups, a perceived importance of family businesses exceeded the overall
impact of those assets on wealth transfer tax revenues. If the practitioner
responses accurately reflect the views of those who will influence the future
of the wealth transfer taxes, further increases in a separate exemption for
family or closely held business assets are likely.'
163 The 1999 Act vetoed by President Clinton on September 23, 1999 would have
reached such a compromise through adopting a modified carryover basis regime to supplant
the wealth transfer taxes effective for years following December 31, 2008. See supra note 4
for a brief description of the legislation.
164 Predicting future political actions is a foolhardy exercise in many respects. For
example, despite my theme of an incrementalist "muddling along" course for the wealth
transfer taxes, the 106th Congress, flush with the prospect of budget surpluses that would
ease fiscal constraints, passed legislation (vetoed by President Clinton on September 23,
1999) that would have abolished the wealth transfer taxes for years following December 31,
2008. See supra note 4 for a brief description of the legislation. Also, the legislation did
not follow the predicted pattern of Congressional solicitousness toward family businesses;
the conference agreement rejected a Senate amendment that would have increased the
qualified family-owned business interests deduction under I.R.C. § 2057 from $675,000 to
$1,975,000.
The repeal issue is far from settled. Republican presidential candidate George W.
Bush, for example, has proposed a phased-in reduction of the wealth transfer tax rates,
completely eliminating the taxes for years after 2008. See Bush To Propose Detailed Tax
Cut Plan, THE WHITE HouSE BULLETIN, Dec. 1, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS file. Meanwhile possible presidential candidate Donald J. Trump proposed a
one-time tax on the net worth of individuals and trusts with net worths in excess of
$10,000,000, coupled with an outright repeal of the wealth transfer taxes. See Adam
Nagourney, Trump Proposes Clearing Nation's Debt at Expense of the Rich, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1999, at A19.
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APPENDIX A - Practitioner Survey Instrument
The Future of the Federal Wealth Transfer Tax:
A Study of Attitudes and Perceptions
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 was a partial response to a continuing
debate concerning the direction of federal wealth transfer taxation. This
survey explores:
* the perceptions of estate planners and law teachers
concerning the impact of the taxes on family businesses in
particular;
* attitudes toward various proposals for changes to the
federal wealth transfer tax; and
* the importance of common estate planning techniques and
issues.
Please answer all of the questions. You may be assured of
complete anonymity. If you wish to comment on any questions or qualify
your answers, please use the margins.
Thank you for your help.
Return this questionnaire in the enclosed envelope or to:
Associate Professor Wayne M. Gazur
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Our first concern is addressing the impacts of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
Q-1. With respect to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, what do you expect to be
the impact of the amendments on your estate planning practice revenues? (circle
one)
1. Decline (estimate the percentage) 3. Roughly no change
2. Increase (estimate the percentage) 4. Do not know
Q-2. If the federal estate, gift, and generation skipping transfer tax were abolished
entirely (without a direct replacement), what would you expect to be the impact
on your estate planning practice revenues? (circle one)
1. Decline _(estimate the percentage) 3. Roughly no change
2. Increase (estimate the percentage) 4. Do not know
Q-3. Although it is very difficult to generalize, what would be your estimate of the
fee paid to you for estate planning services by a typical estate planning client?
(circle one)
1. $300-$1,000 5. $10,001-$20,000
2. $1,001-$2,000'\ 6. $20,001-$35,000
3. $2,001-$5,000 7. Other (specify) $.
4. $5,001-$10,000
Q-4. By how much, if any, will the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 changes increase
or decrease the typical estate planning fee amount in Question 3? (circle one)
1. Increase (specify) $. 3. No change
2. Decrease (specify) $ 4. Do not know
Q-5. Again, although this is very difficult to quantify in most situations, what
percentage of the fee in Question 3 would be strictly succession and disposition
related, without any federal wealth transfer tax consequences? (circle one)
1. 0-20% 4. 61-80%
2. 21-40% 5. 81-100%
3. 41-60% 6. Do not know
Q-6. After taking into account the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 changes, what
would be the percentage in Question 5? (circle one)
1. 0-20% 4. 61-80%
2. 21-40% 5. 81-100%
3. 41-60% 6. Do not know
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Next, we would like your perceptions and attitudes about the federal wealth
transfer tax in the family business context.
Q-7. In your experience, in what percentage of family business situations would
the imposition of the federal wealth transfer tax have a significant effect on the
long-term survival of the business (assuming the use of customary planning
techniques such as life insurance, gifting, valuation discounts, etc.)? (please
complete)
Q-8. In your experience, in what percentage of family business situations do
members of the next generation have the interest and aptitude to continue operating
the business? (please complete)
Q-9. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 creates an additional exemption under
newly enacted I.R.C. § 2033A for family businesses in which at least 50% of the
business is owned by the decedent and members of the decedent's family (or 70%
is owned by two families, or 90% is owned by three families). In your view, what
should be the amount of that exemption? (please complete)
$_ Amount of the exemption in dollars
Q-10. If you were designing an exemption for family businesses, what ownership
or participation criteria would you use? (Circle all that apply.)
1. The newly enacted I.R.C. § 2033A parameters
2. Legal control of voting stock
3. Effective control of strategic directions
4. Founder's descendant is CEO, director, or chair of the board
5. Other (specify)
Q-1 1. As your estimate, what percentage of publicly held companies are "family"
businesses (i.e., where a descendant of the founding family is a key officer,
director, or owner; 4-5% or more of the voting stock is held by a family or group
of families; inside and outside representation by the family on the board of
directors)? (please complete)
% of publicly held companies
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Q-14. What percentage of the gross estates (in which a federal estate tax return
is filed) of your clients is typically represented by family farms or closely-held
businesses? (circle one)









11. Do not know
Q-15. As your estimate, what percentage of gross estates (in which a federal
estate tax return is filed) overall for all decedents is represented by family farms or
closely-held businesses? (circle one)
1. 0-5% 6. 41-50%







Q-18. In your view, what should be the amount of the general exemption for the
federal wealth transfer tax?
$ (Use a dollar exemption equivalent rather than a credit amount.)
Now we would like to ask about your general attitudes concerning the federal
wealth transfer tax and replacements for it.
Q-21. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following
statements. If a question refers to a "family business" assume a business in which
family members are directly involved in managing or final decisions or in which
family members have substantial ownership of the business.
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Strongly Neither Agree nor Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
1. The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished because it significantly
discourages entrepreneurial activity.
1 2 3 4 5
2. The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished, even if any revenue loss
were replaced by an increase in the upper marginal income tax rates.
1 2 3 4 5
3. The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished because the revenue yield
is probably less than the costs of its administration and taxpayer compliance and
planning.
1 2 3 4 5
4. The federal wealth transfer tax is a significant obstacle to the continuation of
family businesses.
1 2 3 4 5
5. The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished because it reduces the
income tax and employment tax yields by more than the wealth transfer tax
revenues it collects.
1 2 3 4 5
6. I would support the elimination of the federal wealth transfer tax even if the
trade-off were implementation of some form of carryover basis (e.g., repeal of
I.R.C. § 1014) or taxation of accrued gains at death.
1 2 3 4 5
7. The federal wealth transfer tax should be strengthened further, eliminating
loopholes and The increasing its coverage.
1 2 3 4 5
8. I would support an expanded exemption for family businesses, preserving,
however, the estate tax for other types of assets.
1 2 3 4 5
9. The federal wealth transfer tax should be replaced with a consumption-based
tax.
1 2 3 4 5
10. If a consumption-based tax were adopted, it should incorporate a
progressive rate structure.
1 2 3 4 5
11. The federal wealth transfer tax should be eliminated, replaced by inclusion
of gifts and inheritances in taxable income.
1 2 3 4 5
12. The federal wealth transfer tax should be retained, but the general
exemption should be increased significantly for all decedents.
1 2 4 5
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13. The federal wealth transfer tax has failed in its goal to significantly
moderate the distribution of wealth and should therefore be abolished.
1 2 3 4 5
14. The QTIP election in application often promotes gender bias against
females.
1 2 3 4 5
Finally, we would like to ask some questions about yourself to help interpret
the results.
Q-22. How many years of estate planning experience do you have? (circle one)
1. None-2 years 4. 11-20 years
2. 3-5 years 5. More than 20 years
3. 6-10 years
Q-23. What is the net worth of your typical estate planning client? (circle One)
1. $50,000-$300,000 6. $1,501,000-$2,000,000
2. $301,000-$600,000 7. $2,001,000-$2,500,000
3. $601,000-$900,000 8. $2,501,000-$3,000,000
4. $901,000-1,200,000 9. $3,001,000-$5,000,000
5. $1,201,000-41,500,000 10. Other (specify)
Q-24. What is the net worth of your wealthiest estate planning client? (please
complete)
$. net worth
Q-25. What is your age? (circle one)
1. 25-29 4. 50-59
2. 30-39 5. 60-70
3. 40-49 6. Other (specify)
Q-26. In which state do you practice? (please complete)
state
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Q-28. How would you generally characterize your political views and
convictions? (circle one)
1. Very Liberal 4. Somewhat Conservative
2. Somewhat Liberal 5. Very Conservative
3. Moderate
Q-29. What percentage of your practice is devoted to estate planning? (circle one)
1. Less than10% 5. 51-60%
2. 10-20% 6. 61-80%
3. 21-30% 7. 81-100%
4. 31-50%
Q-30. With the current exemptions, if you were to pass away, would your estate
pay an estate tax? (circle one)
1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know
Is there anything else you would like to tell us about the
direction of the federal wealth transfer tax? If so, please use the back
page for that purpose. For example, if you believe that the federal
wealth transfer tax should be retained as is, abolished, or modified,
please explain the basis for your opinion.
Your contribution to this effort is greatly appreciated. If you would
like a citation to a future published article addressing this survey, please
write "citation requested" on the back of the return envelope, printing
your name and address below it. Please do not put this information on the
questionnaire itself.
Thank you for your responses. Please enclose the survey in the
prepaid postage business reply envelope and deposit it in the United States
mail.
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If you have questions regarding your rights as a subject, any
concerns regarding this project or any dissatisfaction with any aspect of
this study, you may report them (confidentially, ifyou wish) to the Executive
Secretary, Human Research Committee, Graduate School, Campus Box 26,
University of Colorado-Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309-0026 or by telephone
to (303) 492-7401. Copies of the University of Colorado Assurance of
Compliance to the federal government regarding human subject research
are available upon requestfrom the Graduate School address listed above.
Practitioner Survey
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APPENDIX B - Law Professor Survey Instrument
The Future of the Federal Wealth Transfer Tax:
A Study of Attitudes and Perceptions
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 was a partial response to a
continuing debate concerning the direction of federal wealth transfer
taxation. This survey explores:
* the perceptions of estate planners and law teachers
concerning the impact of the taxes on family businesses in
particular;
* attitudes toward various proposals for changes to the
federal wealth transfer tax; and
* the importance of common estate planning techniques and
issues.
Please answer all of the questions. You may be assured of
complete anonymity. If you wish to comment on any questions or qualify
your answers, please use the margins.
Thank you for your help.
Return this questionnaire in the enclosed envelope or to:
Associate Professor Wayne M. Gazur
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Our first concern is addressing the impacts of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
Q-1. With respect to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, what do you expect to be
the impact of the amendments on private estate planning practice revenues? (circle
one)
1. Decline _(estimate the percentage) 3. Roughly no change
2. Increase (estimate the percentage) 4. Do not know
Q-2. If the federal estate, gift, and generation skipping transfer tax were abolished
entirely (without a direct replacement), what would you expect to be the impact
on private estate planning practice revenues? (circle one)
1. Decline _ _ (estimate the percentage) 3. Roughly no change
2. Increase_ (estimate the percentage) 4. Do not know
Q-3. Although it is very difficult to generalize, what percentage of the fee paid
to practitioners for estate planning services by a typical estate planning client
would be strictly succession and disposition related, without any federal wealth
transfer tax consequences? (circle one)
1. 0-20% 4. 61-80%
2. 21-40% 5. 81-100%
3. 41-60% 6. Do not know
Q-4. After taking into account the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 changes, what
would be the percentage in Question 3? (circle one)
4. 0-20% 4. 61-80%
5. 21-40% 5. 81-100%
6. 41-60% 6. Do not know
Next, we would like your perceptions and attitudes about the federal wealth
transfer tax in the family business context.
Q-5. As your estimate, in approximately what percentage of family business
situations would the imposition of the federal wealth transfer tax have a significant
effect on the long-term survival of the business (assuming the use of customary
planning techniques such as life insurance, gifting, valuation discounts, etc.)?
(please complete)
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Q-6. As your estimate, in approximately what percentage of family business
situations do members of the next generation have the interest and aptitude to
continue operating the business? (please complete)
Q-7. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 creates an additional exemption under
newly enacted I.R.C. § 2033A for family businesses in which at least 50% of the
business is owned by the decedent and members of the decedent's family (or 70%
is owned by two families, or 90% is owned by three families). In your view, what
should be the amount of that exemption? (please complete)
$ Amount of the exemption in dollars
Q-8. If you were designing an exemption for family businesses, what ownership
or participation criteria would you use? (Circle all that apply.)
1. The newly enacted I.R.C. § 2033A parameters
2. Legal control of voting stock
3. Effective control of strategic directions
4. Founder's descendant is CEO, director, or chair of the board
5. Other (specify)
Q-9. As your estimate, what percentage of publicly held companies are "family"
business (i.e., where a descendant of the founding family is a key officer, director,
or owner; 4-5% or more of the voting stock is held by a family or group of
families; inside or outside representation by the family on the board of directors)?
(please complete)
% of publicly held companies
Q-12. As your estimate, what percentage of gross estates (in which a federal
estate tax return is filed) is represented by family farms or closely-held businesses?
(circle one)
1. 0-5% 6. 41-50%
2. 6-10% 7. 51-70%
3. 11-20% 8. 71-80%
4. 21-30% 9. 81-90%
5. 31-40% 10. 91-100%
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Q-15. In your view, what should be the amount of the general exemption for the
federal wealth transfer tax?
$ (Use a dollar exemption equivalent rather than a credit amount.)
Now we would like to ask about your general attitudes concerning the federal
wealth transfer tax and replacements for it.
Q-18. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following
statements. If a question refers to a "family business" assume a business in which
family members are directly involved in managing or final decisions or in which
family members have substantial ownership of the business.
Strongly Neither Agree nor Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
1. The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished because it significantly
discourages entrepreneurial activity.
1 2 3 4 5
2. The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished, even if any revenue loss
were replaced by an increase in the upper marginal income tax rates.
1 2 3 4 5
3. The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished because the revenue yield
is probably less than the costs of its administration and taxpayer compliance and
planning.
1 2 3 4 5
4. The federal wealth transfer tax is a significant obstacle to the continuation of
family businesses.
1 2 3 4 5
5. The federal wealth transfer tax should be abolished because it reduces the
income tax and employment tax yields by more than the wealth transfer tax
revenues it collects.
1 2 3 4 5
6. I would support the elimination of the federal wealth transfer tax even if the
trade-off were implementation of some form of carryover basis (e.g., repeal of
I.R.C. section 1014) or taxation of accrued gains at death.
1 2 3 4 5
7. The federal wealth transfer tax should be strengthened further, eliminating
loopholes and increasing its coverage.
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8. I would support an expanded exemption for family businesses, preserving,
however, the estate tax for other types of assets.
1 2 3 4 5
9. The federal wealth transfer tax should be replaced with a consumption-based
tax.
1 2 3 4 5
10. If a consumption-based tax were adopted, it should incorporate a
progressive rate structure.
1 2 3 4 5
11. The federal wealth transfer tax should be replaced by inclusion of gifts and
inheritances in taxable income.
1 2 3 4 5
12. The federal wealth transfer tax should be retained, but the general
exemption should be increased significantly for all decedents.
1 2 3 4 5
13. The federal wealth transfer tax has failed in its goal to significantly
moderate the distribution of wealth and should therefore be abolished.
1 2 3 4 5
14. The QTIP election in application often promotes gender bias against
females.
1 2 3 4 5
Finally, we would like to ask some questions about yourself to help interpret
the results.
Q-20. How many years of estate planning experience in private practice do you
have? (circle one)
1. None-2 years 4. 11-20 years
2. 3-5 years 5. More than 20 years
3. 6-10 years
Q-21. How many years of teaching experience do you have in the area of Federal
Estate & Gift Taxation or Estate Planning? (circle one)
1. Less than 1 year 3. 6-10 years
4. More than 10 years2. 1-5 years
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Q-25. What is your age? (circle one)
1. 25-29 4. 50-59
2. 30-39 5. 60-70
3. 40-49 6. Other (specify)
Q-26. What is your gender? (circle one)
1. Male
2. Female
Q-27. How would you generally characterize your political views and
convictions? (circle one)
1. Very liberal 4. Somewhat conservative
2. Somewhat liberal 5. Very conservative
3. Moderate
Q-28. With the current exemptions, if you were to pass away, would your estate
pay an estate tax? (circle one)
1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know
Is there anything else you would like to tell us about the
direction of the federal wealth transfer tax? If so, please use the back
page for that purpose. For example, if you believe that the federal
wealth transfer tax should be retained as is, abolished, or modified,
please explain the basis for your opinion.
Your contribution to this effort is greatly appreciated. Ifyou would
like a reprint of a future published article addressing this survey, please
write "reprint requested" on the back of the return envelope, printing your
name and address below it. Please do not put this information on the
questionnaire itself.
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Thank you for your responses. Please enclose the survey in the
prepaid postage business reply envelope and deposit it in the United States
mail.
If you have questions regarding your rights as a subject, any
concerns regarding this project or any dissatisfaction with any aspect of
this study, you may report them (confidentially, ifyou wish) to the Executive
Secretary, Human Research Committee, Graduate School, Campus Box 26,
University of Colorado-Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309-0026 or by telephone
to (303) 492-7401. Copies of the University of Colorado Assurance of
Compliance to the federal government regarding human subject research
are available upon request from the Graduate School address listed above.
Educator Survey
